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Abstract
This thesis presents an efficient and integrated approach to integrity constraint 
checking for advanced database systems. The proposed approach essentially consists 
of three phases: constraint decomposition, global enforcement strategy and local 
enforcement tuning.
The central theme of this dissertation is the development of constraint decompo­
sition theory, which can be used to decompose each constraint formula into a set of 
constraint sub-formulas. The constraint sub-formulas derived from the decomposition 
satisfy the sufficient conditions imposed by the original constraint and are also much 
simpler and more efficient to check. The decomposition is done only once for each 
constraint, at the time of its definition.
The global enforcement strategies, with the application of decomposition theory, 
are studied in both sequential and parallel environments. The physical characteristics 
of the database state is used to determine the checking order or to make assignment of 
constraint sub-formulas to processing elements. It is shown that the performance of 
constraint enforcement, with the application of the decomposition theory, is much 
better than that without the application of the decomposition theory.
Local enforcement tuning methods are developed to further simplify each con­
straint sub-formula derived at constraint decomposition phase. Because of the simpli­
city of constraint sub-formulas, more efficient and simple methods can be used. Furth­
ermore, more information, such as update types and update dataware available for the 
purpose of simplification.
The fundamental assumption underlying our approach is that most database 
updates satisfy integrity constraints. A second assumption is that transactions are 
localized and database updates are nonuniform in their distribution. Based on these 
assumptions, the proposed approach will achieve a significant performance increase 
over previous approaches.
Chapter I: Introduction
1.1 Problem and Motivations
An integrity constraint on a database is a restriction on data in the database that 
defines the relationships between data items. The function of an integrity subsystem in 
a database management system is to maintain the validity of the data in the database, 
i.e., to insure that all constraints defined upon the database are satisfied. Because data­
base integrity constraint checking is quite an expensive operation and because no 
efficient checking methodology currently exists, most existing database systems only 
include a "bare-bones" database integrity subsystem.
With the advent of expert database systems and CAD systems, constraint 
enforcement is becoming even more expensive than that in traditional database sys­
tems because those systems must be able to deal efficiently with the following three 
problems:
(1) Keeping track of large volumes of data;
(2) Enforcing a large number of integrity constraints;
(3) Dealing efficiently with very complex constraints.
The primaiy objective of this research effort is to develop a realistic, comprehen­
sive, and efficient approach for the validation of data integrity in future database sys­
tems.
In addition, we will provide a framework for future research into problems asso­
ciated with constraint enforcement in future database systems.
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1.2 Related Work
Much work has been done in the area of database integrity in the last fifteen 
years. A general treatment of the problem can be found in 
[Dat83,FeS81,U1182,U1188]. Work on integrity constraints dates back to the time 
when the relational data model [Cod70,Cod71] was proposed. At that time, research­
ers [Fos74, HaM75, Wil72] were mainly concerned with the basic functions and com­
ponents of semantic-integrity subsystems. Several possible integrity-constraint asser­
tion tools were proposed and preliminary enforcement techniques were investigated 
[HaD72, Sto75].
At the end of 70’s, researchers were aware of the unbearable inefficiency of vali­
dating semantic constraints. Some researchers tried to simplify integrity constraints so 
that integrity checking would involve as little data as possible. Emphasis was placed 
on finding an equivalent formula for each of the integrity constraints that would be 
more easier to validate than the original constraint. Blaustein and Bernstein 
[BBC80,Bla81] propose a methodology employing the analysis of the prefix of a con­
straint formula to derive a simpler, equivalent formula. However, they consider only 
single range constraints, and additional effort was needed to recall some information 
about the database state. Nicolas [Nic82] uses closed well-formed formulas to express 
integrity constraints in relational databases. Methods are given to simplify integrity 
constraint checking when an update operation occurs on a current database state 
which satisfies all of the given integrity constraints. The operations of inserting, delet­
ing, and modifying a tuple in a relation, as well as the transactions of such operations 
are considered. The theorems in [Nic82] require that incremental checking be applied
after the update is made. Unnecessary incremental checking may be required for cer­
tain modification operations since a modification operation is treated as a deletion 
operation followed by an insertion operation. In [Kob84], all three update operations 
are considered as individual operations. However, the method is incomplete in the 
sense that the method only handles certain forms of the tuple calculus such as V ,3 
,V3 and 3 V, and not all of these forms have "if and only i f  conditions for incremental 
checking. Henschen [HMN84] uses the knowledge about the update and the constraint 
to identify some specific conditions which may cause an integrity violation. His 
methods depend on predefined updates, and no simplification is considered for u- 
ranges which are governed by e-ranges. Hsu and Imielinski [HsI85] generalize 
Blaustein’s methods for fast checking of integrity constraints to deal with multiple 
(multiple-tuple and multiple-range) updates. His method also needs some extra space 
to record information about database. The goal is to minimize the checking space.
Semantic integrity constraint modeling and enforcement have gained importance 
in recent years as a result of interest in CAD and Expert Databases. In [ShK86] , the 
general issues of constraint management are discussed and the roles of constraints in 
the fields of programming language, database management, and artificial intelligence 
are examined. In [LaS86, Mor86, ShK86] constraint formalisms and their implementa­
tions are investigated.
1.3 Our Approach
In order to achieve our objective, we present an integrated approach to the con­
straint enforcement problem. The proposed approach consists of three phases:
constraint decomposition, global enforcement strategies and local enforcement tuning.
The central theme of the thesis is the development of a constraint decomposition 
theory which can be used to decompose each constraint formula into a set of con­
straint sub-formulas. The constraint sub-formulas derived from the decomposition will 
satisfy the sufficient condition imposed by the original constraint and will also be 
much simpler and more efficient to check. The decomposition will be done only once 
for each constraint, at the time of its definition.
The second phase deals with the global enforcement strategies, using the decom­
position theory. The global enforcement strategies in both sequential and parallel 
environment are studied. The major concerns here are to determine the checking order 
of constraint sub-formulas in a sequential environment and to distribute constraint 
sub-formulas to processing elements so that a better performance is achieved.
The third phase concerns the issues on how to efficiently validate each constraint 
sub-formula. At this phase, more information is available for further simplifying con­
straint sub-formula.
The general approach is depicted in Figure 1.1. The fundamental difference 
between our approach and previous approaches is that they failed to take into account 
the nature of the constraint enforcement problem and the properties of a database and 
the database update. Realizing the nature of the database constraint enforcement prob­
lem, we consider the physical characteristics of the database and the logical structure 
of integrity constraint formulas at the same time in order to overcome the deficiencies 
of previous approaches, which fail to either consider both simultaneously. Since the 
constraint sub-formulas derived from the constraint decomposition phase are much
simpler, and since most database updates satisfy the integrity constraints, the perfor­
mance improvement over previous approaches is significant.
Logical Structure of 
Integrity Constraints














Figure 1.1: General Outline of Our Approach
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The rationale behind our proposed methodology can be seen from the following 
three points:
(1) Nature of the Problem
Previous approaches failed to understand the nature of the constraint validation 
problem. Constraint validation is a facility provided by a database management sys­
tem to protect the database from the updates which may violate the integrity of the 
data stored in a database. The concept of the protection should be understood fully 
here. It is very similar to the protection offered by an insurance company. It is 
assumed that the probability of constraint violation is extremely small just like 
insurance companies assume that the probability of an accident is very small.
Constraint validation is not a part of an application program, i.e., it does not do 
any productive work. Constraints are checked just in case they might be violated. In 
most cases, a constraint will rarely be violated because database operators or applica­
tion programmers usually have sufficient knowledge of the data upon which they are 
working. Constraint are violated by ignorance; so, the chance of violation is quite 
small.
Figure 1.2 shows the differences between previous approaches and our proposed 
approach. Generally speaking, previous methods have failed to understand the nature 
of constraint validation and have made no assumptions on the probability of constraint 
violation. Thus, the cost of checking is independent of the probability of constraint 
violation. It can be seen that if the probability of constraint violation is within a cer­







Figure 1.2 Comparisons of Different Approaches
Furthermore, it is noted that most database updates that satisfy the original 
integrity constraints will also satisfy some kinds of less complicated formulas that 
also ensure the correctness of the original constraint formulas. Because the probability 
of constraint violation is small, the sufficient conditions will be met most of time. 
Only very few updates will violate the sufficient conditions and need to be revalidated 
against the equivalent or original formula.
(2) Logical Properties of Integrity Constraints
The proposed approach is possible because a complex constraint formula can be 
decomposed into a set of constraint sub-formulas, each being a sufficient condition of 
the original formula. The checking of constraint sub-formulas can be done indepen­
dent of one another and is less costly than that of the original constraint. Because of 
their independence from one another, the checking of those constraint sub-formulas
can be done in parallel.
(3) Characteristics of Database Updates
The proposed approach is efficient because database updates follow a pattern and 
the data involved are localized. Some constraint sub-formulas are less costly to check 
than others are at a given time because:
•  The data involved with some constraint sub-formulas are well supported physi­
cally ( with index, e tc ), or
•  Some constraint sub-formulas are record-oriented other than set-oriented.
1.4 Organization of the Dissertation
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows:
Chapter 2 introduces basic concepts related to integrity constraint enforcement in 
database systems. An example is presented to illustrate the concepts discussed. 
Chapter 3 discusses the constraint decomposition theory. We first present the decom­
position technique and then define the run-time parameters. Chapter 4 discusses the 
global enforcement strategy in conventional database systems. Chapter 5 investigates 
the global enforcement strategy in multiprocessor based systems. Parallel checking of 
constraint sub-formulas will also be discussed. Chapter 6 presents local enforcement 





A database system is an important type of programming system, used today on 
the biggest and the smallest computers. As for other major forms of system software, 
such as compilers and operating systems, a well-understood set of principles and con­
cepts for database systems has developed over the years. This chapter introduces the 
reader to basic concepts and notational conventions related to database systems that 
we will make use in later discussions.
2.2 Database Abstractions and Data Models
A data model is a language used to express the logical structure of a database and 
the logical operations that are permitted upon that structure. Thus, a data model is a 
vehicle not only for defining a database’s data elements, relationships, and data types, 
but also the operations on the elements and relationships. Any data model should 
include the following three components:
(1) A data structure to represent a user’s logical view of the database.
(2) Operations permissible on the data structure which constitute the data language 
base of the data model.
(3) Constraints for integrity control, i.e., a data model should be equipped with the 
means to preserve its integrity, to protect itself.
In the past, three particular data models have been dominant: the network model,
9
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the hierarchical model, and the relational model. Numerous database systems and 
query languages have been based on these models.
In the last decade, much research has been done on semantic data models. Most 
of this research has been focused on the Entity-Relationship model because it offers 
the advantages of simplicity and uniformity [Che76]. Recently, database logic 
[Jac82, Jac85] was proposed as a means to provide a formal view to unify the exist­
ing data models.
For the sake of clarity, we have limited our discussions to relational data model. 
However, the ideas which we put forward are applicable to any data model.
2.3 Relational Model
The relational model was originally proposed by Childs [Chi68] and developed 
by Codd [Cod70,Cod71]. Extensive discussions of the theory and practice of rela­
tional data models can be found in [Dat86,Mai83,U1182]. For simplicity, a relational 
database can be viewed as a collection of data tables. In this view, the table’s columns 
are attributes and the table’s rows are tuples corresponding to individual data records. 
There are no explicit connections among the tables, allowing manipulations of them to 
be specified simply and flexibly. One broad class of relational data manipulation 
languages is based on relational algebra [Cod70]. Relational algebra is a method of 
defining operators to transform tables into other tables. Basic operators include restric­
tion, projection, and join. Another broad class of relational data manipulation 
languages is based on the relational calculus [Cod71], an applied predicate calculus.
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A relation is typically defined by giving the name of the relation followed by a 
relation scheme consisting of the attribute names of the relation. For example,
SUPPLY (COMP, DEPT, ITEM) 
defines a relation called SUPPLY with three attributes, COMP, DEPT and ITEM.
An instance of a relation scheme is the "current value" of the relation scheme, consist­
ing of a set of tuples. A state of a relational database consists of all instances of rela­
tional schemes, which satisfy all of the integrity constraints defined upon the database.
2.4 Problems Affecting the Validity of the Data in a Database
There are four areas in which problems can arise that may affect the validity of 
the data in a database. They are:
[1] Reliability. Errors can be introduced by hardware or software failure. Database 
software usually includes facilities to restore a database to a state of consistency 
after such a failure.
[2] Concurrent Consistency: Errors can be introduced into a database if multiple 
users are allowed to simultaneously make changes to the same data item. Data­
base management systems usually include a facility to provide each user with a 
consistent view of a database, shielding each from interfering effects due to the 
activities of other users, while retaining a maximum amount of parallelism for 
concurrent activities.
[3] Security: Errors may be intentionally introduced by malicious or unauthorized 
users. Database management systems usually include a facility to restrict the 
manner in which a given user may access and manipulate data in a database so as
12
to protect databases against operations that are actually illegal.
[4] Semantic Integrity: Errors may be accidentally introduced by users through typ­
ing errors, ignorance or other factors. Database software must include a facility 
to prevent such semantic errors.
The last area, that of semantic integrity is what we are concerned with.
2.5 Semantic Integrity Subsystem
In this section, we will introduce the concept of the integrity constraint. We will 
also outline the basic components of a semantic integrity subsystem and discuss con­
straint enforcement methods.
2.5.1 Semantic Integrity
A database is meant to serve as a model of some limited universe, values in it at 
any given time representing a particular configuration of that application domain. 
Every such world has its own internal logic: a set of rules specifying what constitutes 
a legitimate and plausible configuration. Those rules are called integrity constraints.
There are different kinds of constraints that exist in a real life database systems. 
Constraint classification has been discussed in [Dat86,IyS87]. A constraint can be 
record oriented, which deals with only one record, or set oriented, which needs to 
deal with all the records in a set [Dat86]. Constraints can be inter-relation, which 
involve the data from more than one relation, or inner-relation, which involves the 
data from only one relation [IyS87]. Constraint can be transitional which deals with 
the data from more than one database state, or static, which deals with the data from 
only the current database state [Dat86], The classification of those constraints is
important because the cost for checking constraints in different categories is different.
2.5.2 Components of a Semantic Integrity Subsystem
There are five essential components to a semantic integrity subsystem:
[1] An Assertion Language : A high-level, nonprocedural language is needed for the 
user to specify new integrity constraints. These languages are designed to facili­
tate the specification of:
•  The nature of the constraint.
•  The time when the constraint is to be validated.
•  The action to be taken if the constraint is violated.
[2] An Optimizing Preprocessor : An Optimizing Preprocessor is used to translate 
the high-level constraints into an internal form. This internal form is then used to 
check for constraint violations and to take appropriate action if violations are 
detected. The internal representation is also used by the semantic integrity sub­
system to determine what constraints need to be checked after any database 
change.
[3] A Constraint Enforcer : A constraint enforcer determines which constraints need 
to be checked after one or more database changes occur and performs that check­
ing.
[4] A Violation-Action Processor : A violation-action processor takes appropriate 
action whenever a constraint violation is detected by the constraint enforcer. 
Some possible actions include:
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•  Report the violation as an error, rejecting the requested database change.
•  Report the violation to some appropriate authority, possibly as part of a 
summary report.
•  Initiate automatic corrective action.
[5] A Constraint Compatibility Checker. A constraint compatibility checker insures 
that the set of constraints currently extant for a database is free from conflicts and 
other undesirable properties.
In this research, we will focus on the Optimizing Preprocessor and Constraint 
Enforcer components.
2.5.3 Constraint Validation
A universal method of validating database updates is to use a query evaluation 
procedure on constraint formulas. The application of a query evaluation procedure to 
a query yields a relation instance whereas the application of a query evaluation pro­
cedure to a constraint formula yields either true or false. A  naive approach is to per­
form the update and then to check whether the integrity constraints are satisfied in the 
new database state. If the new database state is inconsistent, then the update must be 
reversed. This method is impractical because:
[1] The reverse of the violated update is expensive.
[2] Too many data elements must be checked.
As a result, researchers have been developing more efficient constraint validation 
methodologies. Basically, the following principles are used for simplifying constraints 
[HsI85].
[1] Limit the range of the integrity checking operation. Assume that the old database 
state is consistent prior to each update. Therefore, when a database is updated, 
only the part of the database whose integrity may be affected by the update is 
the target of integrity checking. For example, consider the constraint that every 
employee’s salary must be higher than 30,000 in the context of updating the 
database after hiring a new employee. If the old database state is consistent, then 
the constraint can be simplified to: "the new employee’s salary must be higher 
than 30,000".
[2] Make use of existing information. For example, consider the constraint that there 
must be at least one manager whose salary is higher than every employee’s 
salary in the context of updating the database after hiring a new employee. If the 
set of managers (expressed as Vmanager) whose salaries satisfy the constraint in 
the old database state is known, then the constraint can be simplified to: "there 
exists a manager in the set Vmanager whose salaty is higher than that of the new 
employee".
[3] Make use of aggregate data. The system keeps track of aggregate data such as 
Average, Max, and Min. When those values are needed in checking a constraint, 
they do not need to be recalculated.
[4] Make use of physical data structures such as index.
Although all of the above mentioned approaches are useful to a certain extent, 
we still can further improve the efficiency by employing our proposed constraint 
decomposition methods before applying other simplification methods.
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2.6 Methods for Constraint Specification
There are two broad classes of languages for integrity constraint specification:
[1] Logic-based language.
[2] User-based language.
Logic-based languages are mainly used as a framework for theoretical research. 
The advantages of these languages are their expressive power, conciseness, and well- 
known semantics. First order language, domain relational calculus, tuple relational 
calculus, and their variations belong to this category.
User-based languages, as the name suggests, are designed for the user to express 
integrity constraints. The major concern in designing this kind of language is to pro­
vide user friendliness and expressive power. Generally, existing query languages are 
extended to handle integrity constraints.
2.7 Overview of MTRC
The assertion language used to define integrity constraints throughout this disser­
tations is MTRC, a Modified Tuple Relational Calculus. This section defines this 
language.
Primitive Symbols
The following are the primitive symbols of the MTRC language.
•  tuple variable and constant symbols.
® function symbols.
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•  predicate symbols.
•  relation names.
•  logical connectives: -i, a  , v
•  quantifiers: V ,3.
© parentheses: (,).
Using the above symbols, the objective is to specify valid constraint formulas 
(vcf). The rules for building vcfs require that terms and atomic formulas be defined 
first.
Terms
Terms are defined recursively, as follows:
(1) a constant is a term.
(2) a tuple variable is a term.
(3) If x is a tuple variable and A is an attribute name, then x. A is a term.
(4) if f  is a function symbol of n arguments and if tut2, •••,/„ are terms, then
f  (tut2, ■ ■ ■ tn) is a term.
Atomic Formula
Atomic formulas are defined as follows:
•  if P is a predicate of n arguments (n £: 0) and if tvt2i■ ■■ tn are terms, then
P(f]...... /„) is an atomic formula.
Valid Constraint Formula
Valid Constraint formulas are defined as follows:
(1) atomic formulas are vcfs.
(2) if C is a vcf, x is an individual tuple variable and S is a relation name, then 
(Vxe S)C is a vcf.
(3) if C l and C2 are vcfs, then -i(C l), (Cl)v(C2), (C1)a(C2), (C1)-KC2) are vcfs.
(4) the only vcfs are those obtainable by finitely many applications of (1), (2), and
(3).
2.8 An Illustration
This section present an example to illustrate the concepts we discussed in this 
chapter. The example is adapted from [Nic82]. Consider a sales company database 
designed using the relational data model. The database consists of four relations, 
represented by four different relation schemes. The relational schemes and their 
intended meaning is shown in Figure 2.1.
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A Sales Company Database
Relation Scheme Intended Meaning





<I,T> e  CLASS 
<D, I> e  SALE 
< E xJE2> e  SUBORD
<=> Company C supplies department D with item I. 
<=> I is a type T item.
<=> Department D sells item I.
<=> Employee E  j is a subordinate of E  2
Figure 2.1. Relation Schemes for a Sales Company Database
The seven integrity constraints on this database that are defined using MTRC, 
along with their English interpretations, are shown in Figure 2.2.
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Integrity Constraints
(1) When a department sells an item then there is a company which supplies this item.
Vxe SALE3ye SUPPLY((x.DEPT=y.DEPT)A(x.ITEM=y.ITEM))
(2) No companies other than company C supplies type T 4 items.
Vxe SUPPLY((Bye CLASS(x.ITEM=y.ITEM)A(y.TYPE=7’4 ))->(x.COMP=C))
(3) Any company that supplies guns also supplies bullets. 
VxeSUPPLY((x.HEM=guns)-»3yeSUPPLY(x.COMP=y.COMP)A(y.ITEM=bullets))
(4) Any company that supplies type T j items also supplies type T 2 item.
Vxe SUPPLY(3ye CLASS((x.ITEM=y.ITEM)A(y.TYPE=7’1))->
Bze SUPPLYBwe CLASS(z.COMP=x.COMP)a(z.ITEM=w.ITEM)a(w.TYPE=7’2))
(5) No company can supply two different departments with item I. 
-n3xeSUPPLY3yeSUPPLY((x.COMP=y.COMP)A(x.ITEM=y.ITEM=I)A(x.DEPT*y.DEPT))
(6) Whenever an employee is a subordinate of another employee which is itself a 
subordinate of a third one then the first one is a subordinate of the later one.
Vxe SUBORDVye SUBORD((y.MNG=x.EMP)-»(3ze SUBORD(z.MNG=x.MNGA(Z.EMP=y.EMP))))
(7) There is at least one type T 3 item which is supplied by every company.
3xe CLASS((x.TYPE=r3)AVye SUPPLYBze SUPPLY(z.COMP=y.COMP)A(z.ITEM=x.ITEM))
Figure 2.2 Constraints defined on Sales Company Database
Figures 2.3 through 2.6 show the database state of Sales Company Database at a 
given time. It can be seen that all of the integrity constraints described in figure 2.2 are 




Cr D x h
cl d 2 h
c2 d 2 h
c4 0 3 h
c4 d 2 Is
C 4 D \ Is
C i D i guns
Ci d 2 bullets
Figure 2.3 An instance of the SUPPLY relation
Figure 2.3 shows an instance of relation the SUPPLY. It consists of eight tuples. 











Figure 2.4 An Instance of the SALE relation.
Figure 2.4 shows an instance of the relation SALE. It consists of eight tuples. 










Figure 2.5 An instance of the CLASS relation
Figure 2.5 shows an instance of the CLASS relation. It consists of six tuples. 
Each tuple records the fact that an item is of a certain type.
SUBORD
EMP MNG
E i E i
E i £ 3
E i E 3
E a e 5
E a e 6
£ 7 E s
E s £ 9
E i £ 9
Figure 2.6 An instance of the SUBORD relation.
Figure 2.6 shows an instance of the SUBORD relation. It consists of eight tuples. 
Each tuple records the fact that an employee is a subordinate of another employee.
2.9 Summary
In the chapter, we introduced the concepts and notations related to constraint 
enforcement in database systems. We reviewed basic concepts on database in general, 
and on relational database in particular. An example is presented to show the concepts 
discussed. We will make use of this example in the later chapters.
Chapter III: Constraint Decomposition
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we develop a constraint decomposition theory for the constraint 
enforcement process. The decomposition of constraint formula is a fundamental step 
in improving the efficiency of constraint enforcement. The result of the decomposition 
of constraint formulas can be used either in traditional database management systems 
running on an uniprocessor based system, or on a database machine with multiproces­
sor supports.
The organization of this chapter is as follows.
First, we give the overview of the approach. Second, we show the motivation for 
our approach and argue the necessity for constraint formula decomposition. Third, 
theories for constraint decomposition are developed and proved. A set of examples 
will be presented to illustrate the decomposition procedure and other concepts dis­
cussed above. Following that, we define run-time parameters to measure run-time 
characteristics, such as the update pattern and the nature of database state. Finally, we 
summarize and discuss the main concepts presented in this chapter.
3.2 Outline of Constraint Decomposition
The basic idea of constraint decomposition is to decompose a constraint formula 
Ci into a set of sub-formulas, C,1,^-2, • • • C/w, such that each of the sub-formulas Cj 
(j=l ,2 ,... mi), is a sufficient condition for the original formula, i.e. C/—>C(- 
C/=l»2, ■ • • ,Wj). As a result, as long as any one of the sub-formulas is satisfied, the
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original constraint will be satisfied. Furthermore, run-time parameters are defined to 
measure the run-time characteristics of database behavior, such as the update patterns 
and the nature of database state, so that we have an objective standard by which to 
choose a constraint sub-formula which is more likely to be satisfied and which costs 
least to check.
3.3 Motivations and Necessity
Constraint decomposition is a natural result of the searching for more efficient 
constraint enforcement methodologies. The motivations and necessity of constraint 
decomposition lies in the following facts.
[1] Characteristics of future database
•  Large volume of data
•  Large volume of constraints
•  Complexity of constraints
Because of this, the cost of checking the validity of database update is very 
high. Thus, the need for any possible improvement of efficiency is apparent.
[2] The equivalent constraint formulas are much harder to find than a less strict for­
mula that only satisfy the sufficient condition. Previous work on trying to find an 
equivalent and simpler formula for original formula is not effective because
(1) either it cannot find a equivalent formula for the original constraint formula, 
or
(2) the efficiency gained by the simplified constraint formula is limited.
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[3] Most database updates satisfy integrity constraints, because database operators 
and application programmers have knowledge about what they are doing. The 
purpose of integrity constraint checking is to prevent errors introduced by 
ignorance of database operators or application programmers.
[4] Most of database updates that satisfy integrity constrains also satisfy some kind 
of less complex formulas which ensure the correctness of the original formula.
[5] Most simpler, sufficient constraint subformulas are easier to check than its com­
plex original formula.
[6] Locality of transactions and nonuniform distribution of database updates are two 
of the characteristics of modem database updates. Because of those characteris­
tics, some constraint formulas are easier to satisfy than others.
The above mentioned facts show the two points. First, the cost of constraint 
enforcement in future database is too big to not be considered. Second, constraint 
decomposition may be of help because of the characteristics of database update and 
database state.
3.4 Decomposition Theories
In this section, we present and discuss the underlying theory in decomposing an 
integrity constraint C, into a set of sub-formulas C,-1, • ■ ■,C/”* , such that each of the 
sub-formulas is a sufficient condition for the original integrity constraint. Before 
presenting our theorems, the following definitions are in order.
Definition 3.1: (Relational Range Prefix)
The form (Qxe X), where Q is a universal (V) or existential (3) quantifier, x is a 
tuple variable and X is a relation name, is called a Relational Range PrefixM
Definition 3.2: (Prenex Normal Form)
A valid constraint formula(vcf) (Q xx xe X  i)...{Qnxne X n) C, where each <2, is a 
universal or existential quantifier, x,- is a tuple variable, x,- ¥xj for i * j , X,- is a relation 




Vx e SUPPLY By e SUPPLY ((.xJTEM *guns) v
(x.COMP =y.COMP) a  (yJTEM =<bullets)) (3.1)
is a constraint formula. Here, Vxe SUPPLY, 3ye SUPPLY are relational range 
prefixes, and the formula is in prenex normal form because all of the relational 
prefixes are in the front of this constraint formula. H
Definition 3.3: {Disjunctive Normal Form)
A  constraint formula is said to be in Disjunctive Normal Form if it is a disjunc­
tion consisting of one or more disjuncts, each of which is a conjunction of one or 
more atomic formulas or negation of atomic formulas.■
Example 3.2
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Formula 3.2 is in disjunctive normal form.
V* € SUPPLY 3y e  SUPPLY (xJTEM *guns )v 
(Vx e St/PFLFSy e SUPPLY )(x.COMP =y.COMP ) a  (y.ITEM=bullets)) (3.2)
With the definitions of the above concepts, we can start to develop our constraint 
decomposition theory.
Lemma 3.1
Let C i and C 2 be valid constraint formulas and R be a relation name, then the 
following properties hold:
(V xeR )C 1v(V xe/?)C 2-^(V xeR )(C 1vC 2) (3.3)
(3x e/? )C iv(3x e R  )C2=(3x e R )(C i vC 2) (3.4)
Proof: The equation (3.3) and (3.4) can be obtained by applying the following pro­
perties in predicate logic.




Let Q be a series of relational range prefixes and Cj and C 2 be valid constraint 
formulas(vcfs), then
Q C iV Q C ^ Q iC iv C d  (3.5)
Proof: We prove the above theorem using induction on the number of relational range
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prefixes contained in Q.
Basis o f induction:
For n=l, the equation (3.5) is of either of the following two form:
(V* eR  )C j v(Vjc e R  )C2-»(Vjc e R )(C ivC 2)
(Hare/? )C iv(3xei? ) C 2- » ( 3 j c € / ?  )(C j v C 2)
The above two formulas are the direct consequences of the equation (3.3) and 
(3.4) respectively.
Induction step:
Suppose equation (3.5) holds for n=k, that is:
(QkQk-i • • 'Q i)C ^ (Q kQk.y ■ • • Q i)C 2->(QkQk_1 • • • Q 1)(C1v C 2)
Then for n=k+l, the left-hand side is:
(Qk+iQk ' '  ” Qi)Cl^ iQk+iQk ' "  Q \ ) C 2
Moving Qk+l out, we have
«2*+i)((Q* • • ’ Q i ) C i M Q k+1) m k  • • • f i i ) )C 2
Applying lemma 3.1, the above formula implies the following formula.
(Qk+i)«Qk  • • * Q i ) C i v ( Q k • • Q 0 ) C 2
Applying induction hypothesis, the above formula implies the following formula.
(Qk+i)(Qk • • • G i X C j v C j )
Thus, the equation holds for any integer n. ■
Theorem 3.1
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Let fit be a series of relational range prefixes and C hC2, ' ,Cn be valid con­
straint formulas(vcfs), then
Q.C jvQ C2v • • • vQ Cn ->Q(C ivC 2v • ■ • vC„) (3.6)
Proof: We prove the above theorem using induction on the number of constraint for­
mulas contained in each side.
Basis o f induction:
For n=l, the equation 3.6 becomes:
Q Ci-^Q tC!) (3.7)
Which is obviously true.
Induction Step:
Suppose equation (3.6) holds for n=k, that is:
i2Cjv£2C2v ■ ■ ■ —>Q(CjvC2v ■ ■ ■ vC^) (3.8)
Then for n=k+l, the left-hand side is:
QC 1v QC2v  ■ • • vQCkvQCk+1
By separating k+ \th sub-formula from the other k sub-formulas, we have:
(QC^vQC^v • • • vQCk)vQCk+i
By applying induction hypothesis, we have:
Q(C ivC 2v • • • vC^)vfiCA+1
By applying lemma 3.2, we have:
^ (C jv C 2v • • • vC^vC^+1)
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Thus the equation (3.6) holds for any integer n. ■
Theorem 3.1 provides the theoretical basis for decomposing a constraint formula 
in the form f2(C1vC 2v • • • vCkvCk+l) into a set of independent constraint formulas 
QCj,QC2, • • • ,ClCk ,SlCk+i, each of which is a sufficient condition for the original 
constraint formula. Because of this, each of 
the constraint formulas derived can be validated independently.
Example 3.3
the following equation is in prenex disjunctive normal form.
Vx  € SUPPLY Vy e CLASS3z e SUPPLY3w e  CLASS ((x.ITEM*y.ITEM )v(y.TYPE*TX)) 
v(z.COMP -x.COMP) a  (z.ITEM =wJTEM )a (w .TYPE =T2))
By applying theorem 3.1, we get the following three different constraint formu­
las, each of which is a sufficient condition of the original one:
C i=Vx e SUPPLY Vy e CLASS 3 z e  SUPPLY3w e CLASS (xJTEM *yJTEM )
C 2=V* € SUPPLYVy e  CLASS3z e  SUPPLY3w e CLASS (y.TYPE * T X)
C 3=Vjt e SUPPLY\fy e CLASS3z e  SUPPLY3w e CLASS ((z.COMP =x.COMP ) a  
(z JTEM =w.ITEM )a (w.TYPE =T2))
U
Lemma 3.3
Let C i and C 2 be any valid constraint formulas, then the following properties
hold.
((V* e R )C i(x )—»C2)=(3y e/?)(C j(y )->C2) (3.9)
((3x e  R )C ! (x)—»C2)=(Vy e /? )(C j(y )-»C2) (3.10)
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C 2—K Vx e R )C i (x )=(Vy e R )(C 2—>C j (y)) (3.11)
C2-->(3*e/? )C jC* )=(3y eR  )(C2-»C ̂ )) (3.12)
-i(Vjc eR )C  j=(3x e R )—>C j (3.13)
-.(3* g 7? )C js (Vjc g /? )-,C ! (3.14)
Proof: The above properties are the direct consequences of the following properties in 
first order logic.
(VxC rfx ) ^ C 2)=3y (C j(y )->C2)
(3xC !(* )->C2)=Vy (C j(y )->C2)
C 2—»VxC i (x )=Vy (C 2—>C i (y))
C 2—»3xC i(x )s3y (C 2 ~ i(y))
—i\/xC i=3x —i C i
—3xC  2=Vx —iC j ■
Theorem 3.2
Let C be an arbitrary valid constraint formula, then it can be transformed into an 
equivalent constraint formula C which is of the prenex normal form.
Proof: We use the induction on the number n of connectives and quantifiers in C.
Basis o f induction:
/
For n=0, C = C, i.e., C is already in prenex normal form.
Induction steps:
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Suppose for n<k we have C ~ C. Assume C has k connectives and quantifiers. 
We consider the following three cases.
Case 1: if C=—iB, then by the induction hypothesis, we can construct a vcf D in prenex 
normal form such that B=D. Hence, -iB=-iD, i.e., C= -iD. But, by applying equation 
(3.13) and (3.14) we can find a vef C in prenex normal form such that -iD=C . Hence,
C=c\
Case 2: if C is B \->B2, then by the induction hypothesis, we can find vcfs B iJS2 *n 
prenex normal form such that B {=B [ and B 2=B2. Hence C = B  [ -^B '2 . By applying 
equations (3.9)-(3.l2), we can move the quantifiers in the prefixes of B j and B 2 to the 
front, obtaining a vcf C in prenex normal form with C=C .
Case 3: If C=(Vxe R) B, then by the inductive hypothesis, there is a vcf B in prenex 
normal form such that B =B . Hence (VxeR)B=(VxeR)B , i.e., C=(VxeR)B . But 
(Vxe R)J3 is in prenex normal form. ■
The purpose of theorem 3.2 is to provide the theoretical foundation for 
transforming an arbitrary constraint formula into a formula in prenex normal form. 
When a constraint is in prenex normal form, it then can be transformed into prenex 
disjunctive normal form by the next theorem. A set of independent constraint formulas 
can then be derived, based on theorem 3.1.
Example 3.4
The following equation is a constraint formula. Let’s see how it can be 
transformed into a formula in prenex normal form.
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Vjc e  SUPPLY (By e CLASS ((X.ITEM =yJTEM )My.TYPE =Ti))->
3 z  e  SUPPLYBw e  CLASS (z.COMP =x.COMP) a  (zJTEM =wJTEM )a(w.TYPE =T2))
After applying equation (3.9), we have
Vx e  SUPPLY Vy e CLASS (((xJTEM =y.TTEM )/\{y.TYPE =T i))->
3z € SUPPLYBw e  CLASS (z.COMP =x.COMP )a (z.ITEM =w.ITEM )a(w.TYPE =T2)))
After applying equation (3.12), we have
Vjc e SUPPLY V y  e CLASS 3 z e  SUPPLY (((xJTEM =y.ITEM )A(y.TYPE =T t))-*
Bw e CLASS (z.COMP =x.COMP)a (z.1TEM =wJTEM )a(w.TYPE =T2)))
After applying equation (3.12) again, we have the following equation, which is 
in prenex normal form.
Vx e SUPPLY Vy  e CLASS Bz e SUPPLYBw e CLASS (((xJTEM =y.ITEM )A(y.TYPE =Tl)) 
(z.COMP =x.COMP )a(z.ITEM=w.ITEM )a(w.TYPE =T2)))
■
Lemma 3.3
Let C be an arbitrary valid constraint formula without quantifiers. Then it can be 
transformed into an equivalent formula which is in the disjunctive normal form. ■
Proof: The above lemma can be derived using the following properties from 
proposition logic.
c i<-»C 2=(C j —>C 2) a  (C 2 ~>C j ) (3.15)
C  2= ~'C  1 v C  2 (3.16)
(~-C1)=C1 (3.17)
— 1 (C 2 vC 2)=—iC 2 a —1C 2 (3.18)
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-i(C ! aC 2)= -iC j V-iC 2 (3.19)
C 1v(C2a C 3)S(C lVC 2)A(C! vC 3) (3.20)
C ^ fC zv C sM C jA C ^v ^ iA C g ) (3.21)
■
The idea of lemma 3.3 is to provide a basis for systematically decomposing con­
straint formulas into subformulas with certain properties.
Example 3.5
The following is a constraint formula not in disjunctive normal form.
Vx e SUPPLY Vy e CLASS ((.xJTEM =y.ITEM )A(y.TYPE =T4)->(x.COMP =C)) 
After applying equation 3.16 we have:
Vx e SUPPLY Vy e CLASS (~,((xJTEM =y.lTEM )/\(y.TYPE =T4))v(x.COMP =C)) 
After applying equation 3.14, we have following formula, which is in disjunctive
normal form.
Vx e SUPPLY Vy e CLASS ((xJTEM *y.lTEM )v(y.TYPE *T4)v(x.COMP =C))
■
Theorem 3.3 (Decomposition Theorem)
For any valid constraint formula C , there exists a set of valid constraint sub­
formulas C i,C 2, • • • ,Cn such that
C <—C !vC2v • • • vCn (3.22)
Where C,-,(i=l,2,...,») is of the form (Q\ • • • Q ln. )M,-. Qj is a relational range prefix
and Mi is a conjunction of atomic formulas without any relational range prefix.
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Proof: The proof of the decomposition theorem can be derived by applying Theorem 
3.2, Lemma 3.3, and Theorem 3.1, in that order. ■
Theorem 3.3 establishes the theoretical foundation for our proposed global 
decomposition method. We can now present the decomposition algorithm based on 
the constraint decomposition theory.
3.5 A Decomposition Algorithm
In the last section, we have presented the theories for constraint decomposition. 
We are now ready to present an algorithm for constraint decomposition. The algo­
rithm takes a valid constraint formula as the input and produces a set of constraint 
sub-formulas as the outputs. Each sub-formula , in the form of conjunction of atomic 
constraint formulas, is a sufficient condition for the original formula and is in prenex 
normal form.
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Input: A valid constraint formula.
Output: A set of valid constraint sub-formulas.
Step-0: If the constraint is already in the form
of a conjunction of atomic formulas, then exit.
Step-1: If the constraint is not in prenex normal form
then move the relational range prefix to the front 
of constraint formula by using Theorem 3.2.
Step-2: If the matrix of the formula is not in disjunctive
normal form, then derive a disjunctive normal form 
by using lemma 3.3.
Step-3 : Derive each constraint sub-formula for each disjunct 
appearing in the formula by using theorem 3.1.
Step-4: Remove unnecessary relational range prefix from 
each constraint sub-formula.
Step-5 : Discard any constraint sub-formulas which are equivalent 
to other sub-formula by renaming some tuple variables.
Figure 3.1. A Constraint Decomposition Algorithm
3.6 Examples
The examples to be presented in this section serve two purposes. First, they illus­
trate the algorithm developed above. Second, we show intuitively under what cir­
cumstances the performance of constraint enforcement can be improved. The con­




Consider the first constraint listed in figure 2.2.
Original Constraint
When a department sells an item there is a company which supplies this item.
V* e SALE By e SU P P L Y ((xD E P T -yD E P T  )a (xJT E M  =y.ITEM ))
Because the original constraint is already in its simpliest form, no decomposi­
tion is done in this case.
Example 3.7
Consider the second constraint listed in figure 2.2.
(1) Original Constraint
No other companies than company C supplies type r 4  items.
Vx e SUPPLY ((By e CLASS (x.ITEM =yJTE M ) A (y. TYPE= r4)) -»(x. COMP = C ))
(2) After first step, we have the following formula in prenex normal form:
V x e  SUPPLY V y e  CLASS ((xJTEM =yJTEM  )A(y.TYPE=TA)->(x.COM P = C ))
(3) After second step, we have the following formula in prenex disjunctive normal
form:
V x e  SUPPLY V y e CLASS ((xJTEM *yJTEM  )v(y.TYPE *T4)v(x.COM P = C ))
(4) After third step, the following sub-formulas are generated:
C^Vjc e SUPPLY V y  e CLASS (x.ITEM ±yIT E M )
C 2=Vx e SUPPLYVy 6 CLASS (y.TYPE ±TA)
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C3=Vx e SUPPLY V y e  CLASS (x.COMP = C )
(5) After fourth step, we have the following simplified sub-formulas by removing the
unnecessary relational range prefix:
Cj=Vx  e SUPPLY V y  e  CLASS (X.ITEM tyJ T E M )
C2=Vy 6 CLASS (y.TYPE *T 4)
C3=Vx € SUPPLY (x.COMP = C )
(6 ) The fifth step does not have any effect because there are no sub-formulas which 
are equivalent. So we still have the same sub-formulas.
As a result, the decomposition procedure decomposes the constraint in this 
example into three distinct constraint sub-formulas. The satisfaction of any one of the 
constraint sub-formulas will guarantee the satisfaction of the original formula. Sup­
pose that we need to insert over 100 tuples in the SUPPLY relation, with x.COMP=C, 
then constraint sub-formula C3 will always be satisfied. As a result, a lot of time will 
be saved.
Example 3.8
Consider the third constraint listed in Figure 2.2.
( 1 ) Original Constraint
Any company that supplies guns also supplies bullets.
V* 6 SUPPLY  ((X.ITEM =guns )-»3y e SUPPLY {x.COMP =y.COMP  )a(y.ITEM =bullets))
(2) After first step, we have the following formula in prenex normal form:
Vx e SUPPLY 3y e SUPPLY {{xJTEM =guns )->(x.COM P =y.COM P )A(y.lTEM =bullets))
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(3) After second step, we have the following formula in prenex disjunctive normal 
form:
Vx e SUPPLYBy e SUPPLY {{xJTEM ±guns M x.C O M P  =y.COM P )A(yJTEM =bullets))
(4) After third step, we have the following constraint sub-formulas:
Ci= V* 6 SUPPLYBy e  SUPPLY (xJTEM *guns)
C  2= V x e  SUPPLYBy e  SUPPLY «x.COM P=y.COM P )A(yJTEM =bullets))
(5) After fourth step, we have the following simplified constraint sub-formulas by
removing unnecessary relational range prefixes:
C != Vx e SUPPLY {.xJTEM *guns)
C2= Vx e  SUPPLY By e SUPPLY ({x.COMP =y.COMP )A(yJTEM  =bullets))
(6 ) The step 5 does not have any effect because there are no constraint sub-formulas
which are equivalent. So, we still have the same sub-formulas.
For this example, if we insert a set of tuples into SUPPLY with x.ITEM* guns, 
then Cj will always be satisfied, which in turn guarantees the satisfaction of the origi­
nal constraint.
Example 3.9
This is the fifth constraint listed in figure 2.2.
(1) Original Constraint
No company must supply two different departments with item / 5.
- 3 x  g  SUPPLYBy g  SUPPLY {{x.COMP =y.COMP ) a  {xJTEM =y.ITEM =1 5) a { x . D E P T  ty .D E P T ))
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(2) After first step, we have the following formula in prenex normal form.
Vje e  SUPPLYVy e  SUPPLY ((x.COMP ty .C O M P  )v
(xJTEM *yJTEM  )v(x.ITEM * I s)v(yJTEM  * Is)v(xI>E PT=yD E PT  ))
(3) After second step, we have the following formula in prenex disjunctive normal 
form.
V* e SUPPLYVy e SUPPLY ((x.COMP *y.COM P  )v
(xJTEM *yJTEM  M x.ITEM  * I5)v(yJTEM  *15)v(x D E P T = yD E P T ))
(4) After third step, we have following constraint sub-formulas.
C  !=Vx e  SUPPLY V y  e SUPPLY (x.COMP *y.C O M P )
C2=Vx 6 SUPPLYVy e SUPPLY (x.ITEM *yJT E M )
C 3=Vx 6 SUPPLY V y  e  SUPPLY (x.ITEM * /5)
C4=Vx e SUPPLYBy e. SUPPLY (yJTEM  * /s)
Cs=Vjc e SUPPLYBy e SUPPLY (x.DEPT=y.DEPT)
(5) After fourth step, we have the following simplified constraint sub-formulas.
C !=Vx e  SUPPLYBy e SUPPLY (x.COMP *y.COM P  )
C2-Vx 6 SUPPLYVy e  SUPPLY (xJTEM *yJT E M )
C3=Vx e SUPPLYVy e SUPPLY (xJTEM  * /5)
C4=Vjc e SU PPLY\/y e SUPPLY (y.ITEM * /5)
C5=Vx e SUPPLYVy e SUPPLY (x.DEPT =y.D E PT)
(6 ) After fifth step, the following sub-formulas are left.
Ci=Vjc e  SUPPLY V y  e SUPPLY (x.COMP *y.C O M P )
C2=Vjc e  SUPPLY V y  e SUPPLY (x.ITEM *yJT E M )
C3=Vjc e  SUPPLY (xJTEM * I5)
C4=Vx e  SUPPLY Vy e S t /m T  (x.DEPT =y.D E PT)
For this example, if we insert a set of tuples into SUPPLY relation with x.ITEM 




After the constraint decomposition stage, any integrity constraint C, has been 
decomposed into C/.C,2, • • ■ C™, which satisfy the following implication.
C , /-i 1 r *  2 . . .  /*»m
We now define run-time parameters which will characterize the patterns of data­
base update and the states of database.
Definition 3.4: Sufficiency Frequency
For an integrity constraint C,, suppose that
c (<-(c<1vciV - - v c ;n')
where C f 0=1.2, ■ mi) are vcfs. If there exist a set of values o f  0=1.2,... m, ) such that 
o/ measures the relative probability that C f would be satisfied after a database update
and £o/=  1 , then of is called a Sufficiency Frequency M  
>=i
Definition 3.5: Cost Coefficient
For an integrity constraint C( , suppose that
C;<—(C/vC^v • • ■ vCD
where C f (j= l,2 ,... mf) are vcfs. If there exist a set of values 8 /  (j=l,2,...Wj) such that 
8 /  measures the relative cost to check the satisfiability of C f at a given instance, and
nn
J) 8 /=l, then 8 /  is called a Ccwr Coefficient ■  
y=i
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The sufficiency frequency and the cost coefficient are very important parameters 
in our attempt to improve the efficiency of database integrity enforcement. The intro­
duction of these two parameters is the natural result of the physical characteristics of 
database state and the update pattern. Because database updates are localized and the 
time needed to access different data sets are different, the costs of checking different 
constraint sub-formulas are different. That is why we need a cost coefficient to meas­
ure the effect of the update pattern at a given time.
When a constraint formula is decomposed into a set of constraint sub-formulas 
based on our method, the satisfaction of any one of the constraint sub-formulas is 
sufficient to guarantee the satisfaction of the original formula. Because of the locality 
of database updates, some constraint sub-formulas will be satisfied more frequently 
than others will at a given time. Thus, the sufficiency frequency is needed to measure 
the relative satisfiability of constraint sub-formulas of a given constraint formula.
The method to compute and update these run-time parameters will be discussed 
in the next chapter.
3.8 Summary
In this chapter, we have discussed how to compile an integrity constraint formula 
into a set of subformulas such that each of them is a sufficient condition for the origi­
nal formula. The rationale behind this approach is mainly because of two reasons. 
First, there is no general way to find an equivalent formula that is much simpler than 
the original formula. Second, since database operations generally follow some pat­
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terns and most of time database constraints get satisfied, some sufficient condition are 
more likely to be satisfied than others. With run-time dynamic maintenance of data­
base state and update parameters, we can get global optimal strategy for checking an 
integrity constraint.
It should be noted that the time spent in decomposing a constraint formula into a 
set of constraint sub-formulas can be ignored because of the following reasons:
[1] It is done only once at the time when a constraint formula is defined.
[2] It is done in main memory. Thus, it is much faster than retrieving information 
from secondary memory.
The set of constraint sub-formulas derived, based on the theories developed in 
this chapter, can be validated in conventional database management systems running 
on uniprocessor based systems, or validated on database machines with multiproces­
sor support.
Chapter IV: Enforcement Strategy : A Sequential Realization
4.1 Introduction
This chapter investigates a possible constraint enforcement strategy with the 
application of the decomposition theory developed in the previous chapter. Chapter 3 
presented a theoretical foundation for constraint decomposition. With a set of con­
straint sub-formulas derived by the constraint decomposition method, how we are 
going to enforce those constraint sub-formulas so as to guarantee the validity of the 
original constraint? What is the efficiency gained by using the constraint decomposi­
tion? Those questions will be partially answered in this chapter.
Specifically, we are going to discuss constraint enforcement strategies in conven­
tional database management systems running on uni-processor based systems. We first 
discuss the strategy to maintain run-time parameters. The objective here is to accu­
rately record database update patterns and current state of database. Then, a global 
checking procedure that makes use of those run-time parameters will be presented and 
discussed. Finally, the performance of this enforcement strategy will be analyzed both 
in terms of checking time and checking space.
4.2 Maintenance of Run-time Parameters
In chapter 3, we defined two run-time parameters: the sufficiency frequency (SF) 
and the cost coefficient(CC). They together record the characteristics of the current 
state and the update pattern of a database. To reflect the continuous change of the 
database, those parameters need to be updated each time the database is modified, as 
database modification changes the state of the database and the update pattern changes
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over time. In this section, the methods for dynamically recomputing sufficiency fre­
quencies and cost coefficients will be presented and discussed.
4.2.1 Computing SF and CC
From their definition, SF measures the relative probability that a constraint sub­
formula will be satisfied upon a database update, and CC measures the relative cost of 
checking the satisfiability of a constraint subformula. Since a database is an evolving 
entity, its state is changing over time, CC cannot be a constant. Likewise, since update 
pattern also has its locality, SF will also be changing.
In the following, we shall present a method to recompute those parameters each 
time a database update occurs.
Procedure for Computing SF and CC
[1] Initialization: For any constraint C and its associated sufficient sub-formulas 
C\, C 2 , ’ ’ ‘ »Crt, let jj,f = o, = 8 ,- = —; is the cost of checking constraint
sub-formula C;, a , is the sufficient frequency for C,- and 8 ; is the cost coefficient 
for C ,.





where £ is a constant.
[3] Update CC: Suppose after update, let the subformulas for a constraint C be 
renamed as Ctl, Cti, ..., Ctp, CUl, C„2, • • • wherep  + q = n. The subformu­
las with subscript tt , ( 1  <, i <,p) are those which have been checked for validity 
and the cost for checking each of these subformulas are represented as 
p . , , , , \ i tp- The subformulas with subscript Uj , ( \ < j  <q)  are those 
which have not been checked for validity, and the cost for checking each of these 
formulas are previous values, which can also be represented similarly by 
pMl, |itt2, • • • , |i„?. Since the database is changing, the cost for checking each




Suppose C = { C i , C 2 , C j , C 4 , C 5 ,C^} and £ = 1. Then after initialization, 
we have the following:
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Upon an update, if sub-formula 3 is satisfied, then we update sufficiency frequen­
cies according to equation (4.1) and (4.2)
_1 _
6 1
1 +  1 12
/ = 1 , 2 ,4 ,5 , 6
0>3 -
7
1 + 1 12 
Suppose m  = 8 , |i2  6  and |i3  = 12, then,
8 > = i f j = 0 3 0
52 = ^ j =°.23
f c - S J " " 5
84 = ^ r r = 0 -0 0 6 3zo.5
J_
5̂ = 2I 5 ='90063 
6‘ = - £ j ■' 0 0 0 6 3
In summary, after update, the matrix for p., 8  and cj are as follows:
r 8 0.30
6 0.23


















In section 4.2.1, we presented a procedure to update the sufficiency frequency 
and the cost coefficient. The idea of the proposed update procedure is to make those 
run-time parameter up to date, i.e., reflecting the most current state and update pattern 
of the database. The following two points are made about the update procedure.
(1) The Frequency of Updating Run-time Parameters
The above proposed procedure is invoked each time a database update occurs. 
This will be best if the update of those run-time parameters does not take any time. 
However, the computation of a run-time parameter does take some time, so other con­
siderations on when a system invokes the update procedure for run-time parameters 
are necessary.
In the following, we list a few possible methods.
[1] Periodically recomputing: This approach calls for recomputing the sufficiency 
frequency and cost coefficient every so often at fixed time interval. A system 
timer is set to that interval. Whenever the timer times out, the procedure for 
updating the run-time parameters will be called.
[2] Transaction Unit: This approach calls for recomputing the sufficiency frequency 
and cost coefficient whenever a transaction occurs.
[3] Update Unit: This approach calls for recomputing the sufficiency frequency and 
cost coefficient every fixed number of updates. A system counter is used to 
record the number of updates processed. When the counter reaches a predefined 
number, the procedure for updating the run-time parameters will be called.
The above are just a few methods that can be used instead of updating run-time 
parameters for every update. All the methods have pros and cons. Choosing which 
method to use depends on the attributes of a database.
(2) On Choosing the Value of 2;
The value of £ reflects the rate of change of the sufficiency frequency. A constant 
value of % in the computation will gradually change the relative values of the 
sufficiency frequencies. For a database that evolves smoothly, it is better to fix the 
value of 4* When a database changes sharply, we may use a bigger value of £ to 
immediately reflect that change.
4.3 Global Checking Procedure
Since we have defined the database state dependent parameters, SF and CC, and 
provided a method to recompute them, the problem remaining is to give an overall 
checking process.
The following is what an integrity enforcer will do after a database update 
request.
[1] Choose the subformula in the decreasing order of to check, continue until one
o
of them is satisfied.
[2] If step [1] fails, then check against the original or an equivalent formula.
[3] If either [1] or [2] is successful, acknowledge the update, otherwise reject the 
update.
[4] Update SF and CC appropriately.
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Example 4.2






































So, the checking order will be C 3  , C 5  , C 4  , C j and C 2
The fundamental philosophy underlying the above proposed procedure is that we
ochoose a constraint sub-formula with maximum — to check. In this way, we may
o
spend the least time to successfully pass the validation. As we can see, we did not
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choose a constraint sub-formula with the least cost coefficient to check, nor we choose 
a constraint sub-formula with the maximum sufficiency frequency to check, because 
the one with the least cost may have minimum sufficiency frequency and the one with 
maximum sufficiency may have maximum cost coefficiency.
4.4 Performance Analysis
It is very difficult to quantify the cost of different integrity enforcement methods, 
yet this task is essential for precisely comparing them. As with any cost method, it is 
difficult to capture all the factors which affect the final cost and to assign a relative 
cost to each factor. Integrity enforcement cost depends on factors such as the structure 
of the integrity to be verified, the type and frequency of update, the storage structure 
of the database, the database state, and the values in the update.
Furthermore, there are different measurement methods to evaluate performance. 
The most popular one to use is checking time to measure the performance, Although 
some researchers use checking space to measure the performance [HsI85].
In this section, we first introduce some basic concepts and notations. Then, we 
analyze performance both in terms of checking time and checking space.
4.4.1 Basic Concepts, Notations, and Assumptions




In this sub-section, we introduce the concepts of checking time and checking 
space. For the performance analysis, we can either use checking time or checking 
space to measure the cost of constraint enforcement.
Checking Time
Checking time is a method to measure the time elapsed in checking an integrity 
constraint. Checking time can be measured in terms of disk read/writes, the number of 
data items examined, or an arbitrary time unit. The objective of various optimization 
techniques for integrity enforcement is to reduce the checking time. Measuring perfor­
mance using checking time is the most popular method.
Checking Space
Checking space is a method to measure the complexity in checking an integrity 
constraint. Checking space can be measured by the number of bounded variables in 
the integrity constraint formula. It is generally believed that the fewer the bounded 
variables inside the formula, the less costly it is to check the formula. Thus, the objec­
tive of various optimization techniques for integrity enforcement is to reduce the 
checking space. The concept of checking space originally appeared in [HsI85]
Formally, checking space is defined by the following definition:
DEFINITION 4.1: Checking Space
Suppose that C (S 1 ,S2, ■ ■ • , S m )  is decomposed into C i(S n ,S i2, ••• , S  u ) ,  
C 2 ( S 2 l , S 2 2 , • ‘ • C n (s n l£ n 2 >  ’ ' ' ’S nin ) ’ SU C h that C < r -C  ^ C  2 V  • ■ * vC„,
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where S,- and Sjk are tuple variables ( l ^ i < m , l < j < n , l < k < m ) ,  then the check­
ing space of C(SiJS2, ’ * • ,Sm) is defined as S • • • xSm. The Checking Space of
n
C jvC 2v • • • vCn is defined as • • • xSy. ■
7=1
4.4.1.2 Notations and Assumptions
The following assumptions and notations are used throughout this chapter.
[1] A constraint formula C has been decomposed into a set of constraint sub­
formulas C j  • • • Cn ,  where each one is a sufficient condition for the original con­
straint formula C.
[2] The cost for checking constraint C without application of constraint decomposi­
tion method is denoted by Tc . The cost for checking constraint C with the appli­
cation of constraint decomposition method is denoted by T'c.
[3] The cost for checking constraint sub-formula C; is Tc .
[4] The sum of costs for checking each individual subformula is equal to the cost for
n
checking the original constraint C, i.e., Tc = '£ T Cj.
i=l
[5] The cost incurred mainly comes from retrieving a tuple from secondary memory 
and not from computation done in the CPU.
[6 ] o,- is the sufficiency frequency associated with C ,, measuring the relative proba­
bility that Ci is satisfied when an update occurs.
[7] 5(- is the cost coefficient associated with Ct-, measuring the relative cost to check 
C i-
55
With these assumptions, we can now analyze the performance of constraint 
enforcement with the application of constraint decomposition theory.
4.4.2 Sources of Cost in Constraint Enforcement
There are three major sources of cost in enforcing a constraint, namely,
[1] Cost incurred by the compilation of a constraint.
[2] Cost incurred by the computation of data or updating run-time parameters.
[3] Cost incurred by retrieving data from secondary memory.
The cost for compiling a constraint formula C into a set of subformulas 
Cj ( i= 1 , • • • ,n ) can be neglected because of the following:
•  The compilation is done only once for each formula at the time it is defined.
•  The compilation is done in memory, thus the cost of compilation is much less 
than that of retrieval of a tuple from secondary memory.
The updating of run-time parameters and the computation of the data are also 
done in CPU. Compared with the cost in retrieving data from secondary storage, this 
cost can also be neglected.
The cost for retrieving data from secondary storage is the major cost in validat­
ing a integrity constraint. So, the analysis below is all in terms of the retrieving cost.
4.4.3 Validation Cost with Respect to Checking Time
In this section, we present several theorems to show the improvement of the vali­
dation cost with respect to checking time when constraint decomposition technique is 
employed. Each theorem deals with different update pattern and state of the database,
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as well as the characteristics of the given constraint. Because validation cost is the 
major cost for enforcement of integrity constraints, any possible improvement of per­
formance should be exploited.
It will be seen that the theorems have considered only some typical cases, some 
of which are extreme, others of which are regular. However, in practice, the charac­
teristics of a real life database lie in between these cases. Thus the results arrived here 
are more or less applicable to a real life database, provided that it meets the charac­
teristics of a future database discussed in the previous chapters.
4.4.3.1 Equal Cost Coefficients
In this subsection, we consider the case with equal cost coefficients for every 
constraint sub-formula C, derived from constraint formula C, i.e. 5j = 8 2  • • • =8n . 
That is, the cost for checking each constraint sub-formula is constant.
Theorem 4.1
Let 8 2  = 8 2  ' ‘ ' =5n. Suppose = 1 and a,=0 for i*k. Then the cost for check-
Tcmg C is equal to — .
n
Proof:
This is an extreme case that one of the constraint sub-formulas will always be 
satisfied. Because we assume that the cost for checking the original constraint is Tc
and there are n constraint sub-formulas, the cost for checking each constraint sub-
T T








This is the case that each constraint subformula has an equal possibility to be 
satisfied. Therefore, on average, half of the constraint sub-formulas need to be
Tc
checked to ensure the validity of the original constraints, i.e., the cost is ——.
2
Formally,
T c 1 2 T c 1 . . nT c 1
n n n n n n
= - y ( l  + 2 + 3+... + n) 
n
T.
=  — (1 + n)n
n 2
Theorem 4.3
1 1  1 1  Let §! = S2  • • • =5„. Assume g1 = —  , a 2  = , Gn = ,
2 Tc




The average cost of checking the constraint sub-formulas is (for n> 1)
, 1 Tc i 2 Tc i 3 Tc i nTc
T CH ± ) — H - z r ) — + (4- ) — +• • • • + ( — )■2 n 2  n 2? n 2 ” n
Tc i i  i
= -£ - ( l+2-i-+3-i-+...+ n— [— )
2n 2 2  2
2 TC
It can be shown that when n is sufficient large, Tc is equal t o ------
n
4.3.3.2 Exponential Cost Distribution
In this subsection, we consider the case with exponential cost distribution, i.e.,
^  21 ’ 22 ’ 2 n ~ l  ’ 2 n ~ l
Theorem 4.4
Assume §i = , 8 2  = , . . . ^  = —^ , 8 n = —^  Suppose o*=l and
T co, =0, l<i <n ,i ̂ , then the cost for checking C is equal to ——
Proof: Because the constraint sub-formula is always satisfied and the cost
T
coefficient of the k th constraint sub-formula is — , therefore, Tc-  ■
2 2
Theorem 4.5
Assume Sj = , 8 2  = ±  , . . . ^  = , 8 „ = Suppose
(i=l,...,n). The average cost for checking constraint C is equal to
2TC
n
It can be shown that when n is sufficiently large, Tc is equal to — —K.
n
4.4.3 Discussions
In this section, we have analyzed the performance of our proposed constraint 
enforcement strategy in terms of checking time, especially the improvement of the 
validation cost with constraint decomposition. The theorems presented in this section 
make different assumptions on the update patterns and state of database. The result is 
true only for the given update patterns and state of database. However, the update pat­
terns and run-time characteristics of any database would usually lie in between our 
assumptions. Thus, with sufficient large number of constraint sub-formulas for a given 
constraint formula (n>3), the performance improvement using our global optimization 
technique is significant.
It is also noted that by the way the sufficiency frequency is defined, we make an 
assumption that constraint sub-formulas of a given constraints can only be satisfied 
exclusively, i.e., we do not consider the case that multiple constraint sub-formulas can 
be satisfied simultaneously. This makes the analysis of the performance a little bit 
easier. It is not hard to observe that in the case of multiple satisfaction of constraint
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sub-formulas, the performance will be better.
The results presented in this section are in terms of average cases. We did not 
consider worst cases because in the worst cases, the cost of enforcing a constraint is 
simply the cost without decomposition. We did not consider best cases because in the 
best cases, the cost in enforcing a constraint is minimal.
4.4.4 Validation Cost with Respect to Checking Space
Measuring validation cost in terms of checking space is not as accurate and con­
venient as in terms of checking time. However, checking space does provide a method 
to characterize a constraint simplification method. To formalize our analysis and dis­
cussion, we need further assumptions and notations.
DEFINITION 4.2 Dividing Factors and Maximum Dividing Factor 
Suppose that C(si , s2, ' "  ,sm) is decomposed into 
Cz(s2i,S2 2 , • - Cn(snl,sn2, ■ • • ,snin), such that C<M?1vC 2v • ■ • vC„, then ij
(j=l,2, ..., n) are called dividing factors and CO = MAX ( i h i2, • ' ’ ,im) is called the 
maximum dividing factor. ■
From the formal definition of checking space, we can understand the significance 
of dividing factors and maximum dividing factor. Dividing factors are measurement 
of the complexities of each individual constraint sub-formula. The smaller the divid­
ing factor, the simpler the given constraint sub-formula.
The maximum dividing factor is a veiy important parameter in measuring a 
decomposition method. It is conceivable that the smaller a maximum dividing factor,
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the better the decomposition.
It can be seen that dividing factors are static parameters, whereas the cost 
coefficient and sufficiency frequency are dynamic parameters. Thus, it is conceivable 
that it is more precise to use cost coefficient and sufficiency frequency to determine 
the checking order than using static parameters like dividing factors, as a database is 
an evolving entity. On the other hand, dividing factors characterize a decomposition to 
some extent. In general, static parameters and dynamic parameters do not conflict, i.e., 
a decomposition with smaller checking space needs little checking time.
From the static analysis, we need a decomposition such that
2 ^ i Xl^y'2X  ‘ ' ‘ xSj. « S  1XS2X • '  • xSm 
y=i
From the previous examples, we can see that our decomposition meets this 
requirement.
4.5 Summary
In this chapter, we discussed a constraint enforcement method with the applica­
tion of decomposition theory developed in previous chapter. We have presented a 
run-time parameter maintenance method and a global checking procedure. We have 
analyzed our methods in terms of both checking time and checking space. We dis­
cussed the performance in terms of checking time in more details. Several theorems 
are developed based on different assumptions to show the performance improvement 
of the proposed method. Because of the locality of database transactions and update 
patterns, the cost coefficients and sufficiency frequency are more likely exponentially 
distributed, thus the cost in checking a constraint with decomposition is more close to
2 Tc
where Tc is the cost in checking C without decomposition. We can see that if 
n>4, then the checking time will be reduced significantly.
Chapter V: Enforcement Strategy : A Parallel Perspective
5.1 Introduction
With the ever decreasing cost of computer hardware, the possibility of imple­
menting a database management function in a multi-processor based system is quite 
foreseeable. However, our ability to design fast and cheap hardware far outstrips our 
ability to utilize this hardware effectively to solve large problems quickly [MoI87]. 
Although early database machine researchers have done a lot of work in exploiting 
parallelism in query processing, the parallelism in enforcing semantic constraints is 
totally ignored. They pay special attention to reducing the cost of hard database 
operations, such as join, division, or cartesian product, when they try to develop data­
base machines. But little work has ever been done to treat integrity constraints in a 
database machine environment.
The objective of this chapter is to generally treat the problem of integrity con­
straint enforcement in a database machine environment, and, specifically, the possible 
enforcement strategy with the application of the constraint decomposition theory 
developed in chapter 3 in a database machine environment. To achieve our objective, 
we first discuss the parallelism that can be exploited in a database management sys­
tem. Second, we will introduce an enhanced version of a database machine with the 
capability to handle integrity constraints in parallel. Third, we briefly discuss the 
classification of different kinds of constraints that call for different operation modes of 
a database machine. Finally, constraint enforcement strategy on a database machine 
will be discussed and the performance evaluated.
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5.2 Parallelism in Database Management System
Database operations and processing are inherently parallel in nature. There is a 
lot of parallelism that exists in a database management system.
5.2.1 Parallelism in Query Processing
Query processing is the one of the most important components of any database 
management system. Exploiting parallelism in query processing is a major task facing 
database machine researchers and developers. The parallelism in query processing 
includes:
(1) Partitioning the data into different groups which are stored on different storage 
media that can be accessed independently of one another, and processing the data 
in different groups in parallel. The query processing procedure of this type of 
system is as follow:
•  The query is analyzed and the request for data is sent to the site where the 
data involved is located.
•  The data is transferred to main memory concurrently.
•  The data is processed and the result is sent back to the user.
(2) Concurrent processing of more than one queries. This involves processing multi­
ple queries in a multi-processor based system.
5.2.2 Inter Database Function Parallelism
Parallelism exists among different database management system components.
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(1) Parallelism Between Database Update and Integrity Constraint Enforcement
Broadly speaking, there are three principal integrity constraint validation 
methods, namely, pre-execution-time, run-time and post-execution time.
With pre-execution time integrity constraint validation, a transaction is allowed 
to execute only after its integrity constraints are evaluated and all constraints are 
found true. Its advantage is that it does not require transaction rollback when integrity 
constraints are violated. Its disadvantage is that the validation and execution are 
sequential, thus the response is slow.
With run-time integrity constraint validation, integrity constraint validation of 
transactions are concurrent with transaction execution, where the result of a transac­
tion is not committed. Its advantage is the concurrent execution, so no need for tran­
saction rollback. Its disadvantage is the complexity of the enforcement.
With post-execution-time integrity constraint validation, the transaction is exe­
cuted first and then the result is validated. Its advantage is its conceptual simplicity, 
and its disadvantage is the need for a possible transaction rollback.
Among the above mentioned methods, only run-time integrity constraint valida­
tion method can achieve the parallel execution of database update and integrity con­
straint enforcement.
(2) Parallelism between query processing and deferred integrity checking
Database constraints pertaining to one database operation can be validated before 
the next database operation, which we call immediate checking, or after the next data­
base operation, which we call deferred checking. When multi processors are used, the
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validation of one update can be done in parallel with another update or query.
5.2.3 Inter Constraint Validation Parallelism
When a database is updated, a set of constraints related to that update should be 
validated. The validation of different constraints can be done in parallel if a multi­
processor based system is used. If we have an unlimited number of processors, each 
can validate one constraint. Otherwise, the load balancing of constraints to processors 
needs to be done to achieve good performance. To get an objective measure of the 
cost to evaluate each constraint, a cost parameter needs to be defined for each con­
straint.
5.2.4 Intra Constraint Validation Parallelism
As discussed in previous chapters, a constraint formula C is decomposed into a 
set of constraint sub-formulas C ls C 2 , ■ • • ,C n, each of which is a sufficient condition 
of the original constraint. The validation of C 1? C 2 , ■ • ,C n can be done in parallel if 
a multi-processor based system is used and the number of processors is unlimited. If 
we have a limited number of processors, we need a load balancing based on the run 
time parameters defined in the previous chapter. We shall discuss this formally after 
we introduce a multiprocessor based database machine.
5.3 A Multiprocessor Based Database Machine
In this section, we propose an architecture of a multiprocessor based database 
machine. We shall describe the major components of the machine as well as the gen­




















Figure 5.1. A Database Machine
5.3.1 General Description
Figure 5.1 shows a general configuration of a multiprocessor based system. The 
machine can either operate in a MIMD mode or a SIMD mode [IyS87], depending 
upon the requirement of the database operations. The discussion of each operation
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mode will be presented in later sections. In the following, we shall briefly describe 
each component of this machine.
•  Host: Host is a general purpose computer which runs the DBMS, has the abil­
ity to coordinate the activities of the processing elements (PE) and distributes the data 
among the storage devices. It maintains a global data dictionary which stores the fol­
lowing information:
(1) The information on how the data should be distributed.
(2) The value of the run-time parameters for each constraint sub-formula.
(3) Cost parameters for each constraint.
The host can be programmed to change operation mode depending on the type of 
operation concerned. It can request the PEi’s to do the same operation on different 
data, or it can request the PEi’s to do different operations on different data.
•  Central Storage Device: The Host assigns a fixed amount of space from the 
main device to each relation that is initially created. The idea is that when the number 
of bytes of a relation does not exceed the pre_defined amount of space assigned to the 
given relation from the Central Storage Device, there is no need to distribute the data 
among the Storage devices, which saves the communication and synchronization 
costs.
•  Storage device 0..n-l: When the number of bytes of a relation exceeds the 
pre-defined amount of space in the main storage device, the data should be distributed 
among the storage devices in such a way that maximum parallelism is achieved while 
the synchronization and communication costs are kept to a minimum. The distribution
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algorithm is to be described in the next section.
•  PEi’s: Processing Element i is attached to storage device i to process the infor­
mation stored there. It can perform basic DBMS functions, such as Selection, Deletion 
and Update and has integrity checking functions as well. It has the ability to commun­
icate with the host, but not necessarily with other PEi’s. The PEi’s can also
access any storage device to retrieve the required information stored there.
•  Shared Memory: Shared Memory is the main memory space for the PEi’s to 
communicate and synchronize with the Host, and to record the results of the opera­
tions.
•  Global Data Dictionary: Global Data Dictionary is used to record the follow­
ing information:
(1) Database catalog: name of relations; number of tuples in the relation, etc.
(2) Data location information: where the data are located and the number of tuples in 
each location.
(3) Run-time parameter value for each constraint subformula
(4) Cost parameters for each constraint formula, if any.
•  Local Data dictionary: The Local Data Dictionary is used by the PEi to 
decide whether it needs to respond to a request from the host. It records information 
on the data fragment stored there.
5.3.2 Data Distribution
In this section, we describe the data distribution in the proposed database 
machine. Whenever data are to be inserted into the database, the algorithm must
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decide how and where the data are to be stored. We first examine the data structure 
used by the algorithm, namely, the Global Data Dictionary. Then, we present a formal 
description of the algorithm.
Global Data Dictionary
As pointed out earlier, the global data dictionary stores the information on how 
and where the data are to be distributed among the storage devices.
The following data structures need to be included in the global dictionary.





VAR GLOBALDATADICTIONARY: array [ 1 ..MAX_RELATION] of ENTRY 
where N is the number of processing elements or storage devices.
For each relation created, an entry is set up as shown above. The variable 
LENGTH records the number of bytes the given relation has and INDEX indicates 
onto which storage device the next tuple is to be inserted.
The Distribution Algorithm
The distribution algorithm is used to decide onto which storage device the next 
tuple is to be inserted when a user wants to add a tuple to a relation. With the informa­
tion in the Global Data Dictionary, the data distribution process is straightforward.
The main criterion is to distribute the data evenly among the storage devices, to 
achieve the maximum parallelism. The algorithm first examines whether the length of
the relation exceeds the pre-defined amount of space in Central Storage Device after 
the given tuple is inserted. If not, then it inserts the given tuple onto the Central 
Storage Device. Otherwise, it inserts it into one of the Storage Devices based on the 
information in the Global Data Dictionary. The algorithm is as follows.
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Algorithm 5.11: The Data Distribution Algorithm
Input: T /* T is the tuple to be inserted */
R /* R is the relation into which */
/* T is to be inserted */
Output: Status /* Status=TRUE if T is successfully inserted */
/* into one of the fragment of R */
/* Status=FALSE if the insertion of T violates */




If not satisfied 






insert it onto main device 
Else 
Begin
insert T onto storage device 
indicated by R.index 





Figure 5.2 A Data Distribution Algorithm.
Note that "length" is the function which takes a tuple as the input and returns the 
length of the tuple as the output. £ is a constant which determines the amount of 
memory space of main storage allocated to each relation.
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It may be noted that the above distribution algorithm is straightforward in the 
sense that its goal is to distribute data evenly among the storage devices to achieve 
maximum parallelism. For other methods of data distribution in a distributed database 
environment, see [Dat86, U1188].
5.4 Data Partition and Task Partition
For a problem to be processed effectively by a multiprocessor based system, it 
must meet one of the following requirements:
[1] Task Partitionable: This means that the task can be divided into a set of smaller 
and simpler sub-tasks, each being processed by a different processing element, or
[2] Data Partitionable: This means that the data the algorithm works on can be par­
titioned into a set of smaller groups, each being processed by a different process­
ing element running the same algorithm.
The enforcement of most constraint formulas meets the above requirements. 
Functional dependency constraints and referential constraints are examples of data 
pardonable constraints. The data partitionable constraints can be validated on our pro­
posed machine in SIMD mode. The constraints we discussed in Chapter 3 are all task 
partitionable, because each constraint sub-formula can be enforced independently on a 
different processing element. The task partitionable constraints can be validated on 
our machine in MBVfD mode. SIMD and MIMD mode operations for our proposed 
machine will be discussed in the following sections.
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5.5 SIMD Mode Operation
In this section, we discuss two expensive integrity constraint enforcement in 
SIMD mode of our proposed database machine. The integrity to be enforced are func­
tional dependency and referential dependency.
5.5.1 The Functional Dependency Enforcement
5.5.1.1 Functional Dependency
Definition 5 .1 : {Functional Dependency)
Let R{A i ^2> ' ‘ ) be a relation scheme, and let X and Y be subsets of 
{ A ^ 42, * • * A n }• We say X—>Y , read "X functionally determine Y" or "Y function­
ally depends on X" if whatever relation r is the current value for R, it is not possible 
that r has two tuples that agree in the components for all attributes in the set X yet 
disagree in one or more components for attributes in the set Y.B
Functional dependency is a very important constraint on a database and many 
design theories make use of functional dependency. However, the enforcement of 
functional dependency is very expensive, as we can see from the following discussion.
5.5.1.2 Checking of Functional Dependency
When a tuple is to be inserted or updated, it may be possible that it violates func­
tional dependency constraints [U1182]. The enforcement of functional dependency is 
an expensive one, because the system has to examine every tuples in the relation. To 
make the checking efficient, we may set up an index on the determinant fields for each 
functional dependency constraint. This will require additional space, occasionally
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greater than the space occupied by the relation itself. But in this architecture, the 
index is not necessary. In the following, we first describe the data structures used for 
this algorithm and then the algorithm itself is presented and discussed.
Data Structure
The following data structures are used in the Functional Dependency Checking 
Algorithm.
STATUS: ARRAY[1..N] of BOOLEAN
The array STATUS[1..N] is used to record the result of checking done by PEi. 
COUNT: Integer
COUNT is used for synchronization between the Processing Elements and the Host. 
The Algorithm
The following is a parallel algorithm for the checking of functional dependency 
constraints.
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Algorithm 5.2 Functional Dependency Checking 
Input: T: the tuple to be inserted 
R: relation name
Rule_id: The id of the integrity constraint





Do the checking in Main device 
Else Begin
Count:=0;
Broadcast T,R to PEi’s;
Send Checking Instruction and the Integrity Rule to PEi’s; 
End




Procedure LocalFD  
Begin
Do the local checking with 













Figure 5.3. A Parallel FD Checking Algorithm.
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The Central_FD works as follows: If after the tuple has been inserted, the total 
amount of memory space occupied by this relation is less than or equal to the pre­
defined memory space allocated to this relation in central storage device, then the 
integrity checking will be done in central storage device only. Otherwise, the host 
broadcasts T and R to the PEi’s so that the PEi’s can check the constraint con­
currently. Synchronization is done by the following statement:
While COUNT<n Do 
wait
After all PEi’s have finished their checking, Central_FD returns the result of a 
logical AND of each STATUS[i].
The Local_FD works as follows: it modifies STATUS[i] based on local check­
ing. Then, it increments the global variable COUNT to signal the completion of the 
local checking.
5.5.2 Referential Integrity Checking
5.4.2.1 Referential Integrity 
Definition 5.2:
Let R[A, X], S[A,Y] be relation schemes, where A is a primary key of relation S, 
and X and Y are sets of attributes. The referential integrity rule states that every value 
of attribute A in R must either (a) be equal to the value of the primary key A in some 
tuple in S or (b) be wholly null. R and S are not necessarily distinct. ■
Referential integrity is a very important constraint on a database. It reflects a
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important relationship between two relations of a database.
5.5.22 Checking of Referential Integrity
When a tuple is to be inserted or deleted from a relation, it may be possible that a 
referential integrity constraint is violated. The checking of referential integrity con­
straint is as expensive as that of functional dependency, because the system needs to 
check every tuple of the involved relations.
As an example, consider the two relations
SP(S#,P#,QTY) and 
S(S#,SNAME,SSTATUS,CITY)
where S is the relation scheme for supplier information and SP is a relation 
scheme for recording the information on which supplier(S#) supplies how 
much(QTY) of which part(P#). The integrity constraint "Any S# value appearing in 
relation SP must also appear in relation S" is the referential constraint to reflect the 
fact an entity that supplies parts must be a real supplier.
The data structure used in referential integrity checking is the same as those 
involved in functional dependency checking.
The algorithm for referential integrity constraint checking is as follows.
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Algorithm 5.3 Referential Integrity Checking 
INPUT: Rule_id The ID of the Integrity rule
T The tuple to be inserted
R The relation name into which R is to be inserted
OUTPUT: A status indicating the result of checking
Procedure Central_RI 
Begin
If R.LENGTH + length(T)<= £
Then
Do the referential checking in main device 
Else Begin
Count:=0;
Broadcast T,R and Rule_id to PEi’s;
Send Checking Instruction to PEi’s 
End






Do the local referential checking 













Figure 5.4. A Parallel RI Checking Algorithm
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It may be noted that the algorithm for referential integrity checking is identical 
as that for functional dependency, except that in the last step of CENTRAL RI, it 
returns the result of a logical OR of each STATUS[i], instead of a logical AND.
5.5.3 Performance
There are three sources of cost associated with enforcement of an integrity con­
straints in a multiprocessor based system, namely,
(1) Communication and synchronization cost.
(2) Computation done on the CPU.
(3) Secondary storage access time.
Secondary storage access time is the major cost in enforcement of an integrity 
constraint. If the database machine is operated in SIMD mode, the synchronization 
and communication costs can be minimized. Also, computations on the CPU are just 
comparisons, therefore they do not take much time.
With the data evenly distributed over storage devices, maximum parallelism is 
achieved. Therefore, if the cost to check the constraint is Tc in a uniprocessor system, 
then the cost to check the given constraint in a multiprocessor based system with n 
processing elements is virtually Tc!n.
5.6 MIMD Mode Operation
In this section, we discuss integrity constraint enforcement strategy in our pro­
posed machine in MIMD mode. In MIMD mode, each processing element executes 
different instruction on different data items. When operated in MIMD mode, each pro­
cessing element can validate an individual constraint in parallel with other processing 
elements validating other constraints, or each processing elements can validate an 
individual constraint sub-formula in parallel with other processing element validating 
other constraint sub-formula. The process of the validation will be discussed in this 
section.
5.6.1 Notations
In the previous chapters, we have introduced the sufficiency frequency and cost 
coefficient as a run-time parameters to monitor database evolution and change. Those 
are dynamic parameters, as their values depend on the current state of database. More­
over, those parameter are associated with constraint sub-formulas, not with the con­
straint itself. We also defined a static parameter, called checking space, which can 
measure the relative complexity of constraint formulas. Both the cost coefficient and 
checking space can measure the cost to check a constraint sub-formula, but they have 
some differences. Using checking space will save some computation time, but it fails 
to consider the physical characteristics of a database. Using the cost coefficient is 
more accurate in measuring the cost of checking a constraint formula, but it does 
require extra computation.
The following definition defines the cost factor of a constraint:
DEFINITION 5.3 Cost Factor
A cost factor of a constraint formula C(S1}S 2, ■ • ’ Sm), denoted as A,(C), is 
defined as |5 j  |x |5 2 |x ...x |5 ’/n |, where S i,S 2, ••• ,Sm are tuple variables. ■
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Since |S i |x |S 2 |x ...x |Sm | = |S 1xS2x...xSm |, the cost factor is actually the 
cardinality of the checking space, i.e., the number of rows in the checking space. 
Because it is a number, it is very easy for a system to compare and measure the com­
plexity of a constraint.
5.6.2 Parallel Checking at Constraint Level
Suppose that we have n processing elements and m affected constraints after a 
database update. If m < n, i.e., we have more processors than constraint sub-formulas, 
then each processing element checks one constraint. If any violation is detected, we 
reject the update; otherwise, we commit the update. If n<m, then we divide the con­
straints into n different groups, each processing elements validating constraints within 
a given group. The criterion to assign constraints to each group is to maximally
exploit the parallelism. In the following, we treat this problem more formally.
Definition 5.4
Let C \ , C 2 , . . . ,  Cm be m constraint formulas and ^  , X2 , . . . ,  be the cost 
factors of C x, C 2 , . . . ,  Cm respectively. If we divide Ci (i=l,2, ... , m) into n dif-
ferent group {C}”, C ^ ........ C,]?}, { C ^ , C ^  C ,J}  , . . . ,
{C'ip • C ?  , . . .  ,C?P } (rip + r2p + . . .  + r„p = m ), then,
(1) Pp = l { C l p , C l p , . . . , C l) n ,  { C p ' C ? ,  ..............................
{C \p , C J f , . . .  ,C?P } } is called an assignment pp .
—  m K(2) Dp = £  —  is called the average group sum o f assignment pp .
i=i «
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(3) Vip = £  X f  is called the the sum o f group i o f assignment pp .
j =i
n _
(4) xp = ^  I Vip — t) | is called the sum o f difference o f assignment pp .
i=i
(5) 'tmin = MEN {( £  | assignment p r range from any possible assign­
a t
ment} is called minimum sum o f difference. ■
With the above definitions, we can now introduce an assignment theorem.
T h e o re m  5.1 {Assignment Theorem)
Let C i , C 2  , ■ • •, Cm be m constraint formulas to be validated when a database 
update occurs, and X2  »• • • be the cost factors of C 1 , C 2, . . . ,  Cm, respec­
tively. If we have an assignment
P , = t{clq ,C}1 ctfucp C%},■ ■ ■ ,{CV jCf C%.}}
-  rn X: hq .
with t) = 2  — , and x>iq = X f,  and
i=l n  j =l
n _
Xq = MIN { (£  | !),> -D | ) | p r range over all assignments}  (5.1)
i=l
then the assignment p q is optimal in the sense that maximal parallelism is achieved. 
Proof:
Without loss of generality, let D1(? £ • • • . To prove optimality, we only
need to prove that for any other assignment
p , ={{C\r ,Cl” ,...,C,yr),{C? ,C? ,Cf  C%}}
n  _
If xp >MIN( £  I x>ir -x> I) and v>lp >v2p Z • • • >onp, then v lp >x>lq.
i=l
Suppose u 1<7> u lp, then fj is greater than one. move a constraint C{q to group n 
such that u 1(? >,u/9+'On̂ . Consider the following four cases.
Case I:
Suppose that
After rearrangement, the sum of difference
. -  n - l  _  . _
S = IViq-v { q- v  | + X  Iv>iq- v  | + 1u ■+v{q- v |
i-2
— n —1 _  _
=Viq-v{q-x>+X \'0 iq--0 \--0 tU!-v {q+v 
i= 2
n - 1 _
=^ i9-2W ?- ^ + Z  l ^ - ^ l  
1=2
Before the rearrangement, the sum of difference is
_  n - 1   _
I ̂ iq -1) | + 1 Xifjq —"U |
i=2
_  n -1  _  _
i=2
n -1  _
= U l< 7 -^ + E  l ^ - ^ l  
1=2
It is easy to note that xq<xq , that is, the assumption that the assignment pq is 




After rearrangement, the sum of difference
. _  n -1  _  . _
Xq~\ Vlq~v{q-V  l+ E  l ^ - ^ l  + l Vnq+Viq-V |
/=2
— n -1  _  _
=-^i?+W 9+ w -S
i=2
_  n -1  _
=2\)-D1(?- 1 ) ^ + 2  l ^ - o |
i=2
Before the rearrangement, the sum of difference is
— n -1  _  _
^ = | D i9- d | + S  I ^ - \ ) |  + |'o/̂ - d |
; = 2
_  n -1  _  _
= % - u + £  ! Viq -1) I +X)
«=2
n -1  _
=^i? - ^ + E  l ^ - ^ l
i= 2
Because
V i q ^  (5.2)
we have
2vlq>2v (5.3)
By adding to both sides of equation (5.3) we have
^l? ~Vnq >2o-Dl9 (5.4)
Comparing xq , xq and equation (5.4), it is easy to note that x'q <xq , that is, the






V n q + v { q > V
After rearrangement, the sum of difference
. _  n - 1 _  . _
i=2
_  n - 1 _  _
=^1 g - v i q - V + Z  | ^ - 0 )  |+ D ^ + 1)^-0) 
i=2
— n —1 _
=-2t>+o)1(?+ o ^ + X  l ^ - ^ l
i=2
Before the rearrangement, the sum of difference is
_  n —1 _  _
'c9= I ^ - ^ I + E
i=2
— n -1  _  _
=\)i9 - v +  2  I Viq - V I +D
/ =  2
n -1  _





-2 v nq>-2x> (5.6)
By adding 'l>i<?+'i)n<7 to both sides of equation (5.6) we have
v  l q - v nq > -2\H-'01 q +x>nq (5.7)
Comparing xq , xq and equation (5.7), it is easy to note that t q<xq , that is, the







After rearrangement, the sum of differences is
_  n -1  _  . _
I "Olq-V{q-X> l + E  l ^ - U l  +  l l ) ^  +V{q~V  |
i=2
— n—1 _  _
=-Ulq + v lq + W -X  I V iq - V l+ U ^ + v lq - V  
i-2 
n -1  _
= M q - V \ q + ' % + £  \V iq- V \
i= 2
Before the rearrangement, the sum of differences is
_  n—1 _  _
^  =  I ^ - ^ I  +  S  l ^ - v l  +  l ^ - v l  
1=2
_  n —1 _  _
= ')i<?- 'u+ E  |Di9-D |-a )^+ i)
i=2
n —1 _
= U l< 7 -^ + E  l ^ - ^ l
i=2
Because
U lq ^ iq + V n q  (5.8)
By moving to the left-hand side and multiplying two sides of equation (5.8)
by 2, we have
2 v lq-2vtnq>2\){q (5.9)
By adding to both sides of equation (5.9) we have,
~Vnq > 2'U/q,-Di<7 +X)nq (5.10)
Comparing xq , xq and equation (5.10), it is easy to note that x'q<xq, that is, the
assumption that the assignment pq is minimal is not true, yielding yet another con­
tradiction.
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Because the above four cases are the only possible cases, the proof is complete. ■
Theorem 5.1 gives a theoretical basis for optimally assigning constraints to pro­
cessing elements to validate. We next introduce an effective procedure to assign con­
straints to processing elements in the hope to maximally exploit parallelism.
Algorithm 5.4 {Assignment Algorithm, Version A . )
Input: A set of constraint formulas
{C\ lX \ , C2/A,2 , . . .  ,Cm/Xm }
Output: A set of subsets of constraint formulas
T i = { C h lX[  CiJXtJ
Step 1: Sort {C\/X -̂ , C 2̂ X2 , • •. ,Cm/Xm } in
descending order based on the value of A,,-.
Without loss of generality, assume X{>X£ . . ..  >Xm
Step 2: Ti = <|>; u,- = 0 (i=l, 2,... ,n), j=0
Step 3: If j+i < m then Ti = Tl u/'C7+(-/A/+(J (i= l,2 ,..., n);
Vi =x>i + Xj+i
Step 4: j=j+n
Step 5: Sort {T i ,T2, • ■ • ,Tn } in ascending order
based on the partial group sum o,-.
Assume ,0 1<O2 ^  ■ • • £vn
Step 6: Go to step 3. ■
Figure 5.5. A Constraint Assignment Algorithm (Version A)
It can be noted that algorithm 5.3 assigns constraint formulas to processing ele­
ments as evenly as possible. The following example illustrates how the algorithm 
works.
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The time complexity of algorithm 5.4 is 0(m/ogm +(m/n)n/<?gn). Because the 
cost factor is a static parameter, sorting constraint formulas are done only once. So,the 
real complexity is O(mZogn).
Example 5.1
Let C= { Cj/3 , C2/4 , C 3/7 , C4/1 6 , C 5/2 , C 6/17}
After step 1 , we have
C = , C 4/16 , C 3 / 7  , C2/ 4 , Cj/3 , Cs/2)
After step 2, we have
Tf = 0 ,  u,- = 0 , ;'=0, for i=l,2,...,n.
After step 3 (j=0, loop one), we have
Tl = {c6ay  ,t2 = {c4/16}
v x = 17, t)2 = 16
After step 4 (loop one), j=2
After step 5 (loop one), we have 
{T2m , T xm }
After step 3 (j=2, loop 2), we have 
T 2 = {CAn 6 , C 3/7} ,
t{ = {c6m , c2/4;
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\)2=23,,u1=21
After step 4 (loop two), j=4
After step 5 (loop two), we have 
{Tx!2\ , T 2/23)
After step 3 (loop three, j=4), we have 
T W C f i /n .C a M .C j/S ; ,  
r 2 =  ^ c 4/ i 6 , c 3/ 7 , c 5/ 2 ;
Dj = 24, v 2  = 25
■
Algorithm 5.4 provides us with a procedure to assign constraints to different 
groups. The resulting assignment is intuitively good or near-optimal. From the 
theorem, we know that the computation to get an optimal assignment is exponential, 
because every possible assignments has to be examined. This involves the study of 
every combination of constraint formulas.
The trade off is the extent of the optimality of a solution and the time spent in 
searching that solution. The fact is that because we need to cany out this task each 
time a database update occurs and the solution just found is only used once, the time 
spent in finding the optimal solution overpowers the optimality of the solution. Gen­
erally speaking, it is not worthwhile to spend exponential time to search for a solution 
which will be used only once.
To make a comparision, we present another version of the assignment algorithm 
that takes less time to finish. But sometime the result generated by this algorithm is 
not as good as that of algorithm 5.4.
Algorithm 5.5 (Assignment Algorithm, Version B . )
Input: A set of constraint formulas
{ C , C 2lX2 , . . .  ,Cm/Xm }
Output: A set of subsets of constraint formulas
{T \ , T 2 , • • ■ ,Tn }
Ti = { C li/X{ , . . . ,C} . / 'kl . }
Step 1: Sort {C \l% i, C 2jX 2 , . . .  ,CmlXm } in
descending order based on the value of X .
Without loss of generality, assume • • ^Xm
Step 2: Ti =  <j); U; = 0  (i=l, 2 ,... ,n), j=0
Step 3: If j+i ^ m then T,- = TiLJ{Cj+i/Xj+i}  (i= l,2 ,..., n);
Vi =Vi  +  Xj+1
Step 4: j=j+n
Step 5: Reverse the ordering of Ti
Step 6: Go to step 3. ■
Figure 5.6. A Constraint Assignment Algorithm (Version B)
Note that the only difference between algorithm 5.4 and 5.5 is in step 5. With the 
aid of a counter or a flag, reversing the ordering of T, takes constant time, whereas
sorting Tt takes nlogn time. It is easy to observe that the time complexity of algorithm
5.5 is 0 (m/<9 gm + m/n). Similarly, because we do not need to sort constraints each
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time we invoke this algorithm, the real complexity is 0 (m/n).
For the constraint sub-formulas presented in example 5.1, algorithm 5.5 will gen­
erate the same result as generated by algorithm 5.4. However, on average algorithm 
5.4 will generate a better result for more time.
Example 5.2
Let C= { Cj/3 , C 2 / 6  , C 3/7 , C 4/1 6 , C5/2 , C 6 /20}
The following are the steps taken by algorithm 5.4 to generate an assignment.
After step 1 , we have
C = {CfJ20 , C 4/1 6 , C 3 / 7  , C 2 / 6  , Cy3 , C sf2}
After step 2, we have 
^  = 0 ,\), = 0 , j= 0 , fo ri= l,2 ,...,n.
After step 3 (j=0, loop one), we have 
T x = {C6I 2 0 } ,T 2 ={C4/16}
Di = 2 0 , x>2 = 16
After step 4 (loop one), j=2
After step 5 (loop one), we have 
{T2/1 6 , Tj/20;
After step 3 (j=2, loop 2), we have
T 2  = {C4n 6 , C 3/ V ,
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T i = f £ 6/20 ,C 2 /6 } 
u2=23,u1=26
After step 4 (loop two), j=4
After step 5 (loop two), we have 
f7 y 2 3 ,7 7 2 6 J
After step 3 (loop three, j=4), we have
T X^ { C ^ , C ^ , C 5 H} , 
r 2  = c c 4 / i 6 , c 3 / 7 , c 1 /3;
Oi = 28, 1 ) 2  = 26
The following are steps taken by algorithm 5.5 to generate an assignment. 
After step 1 , we have
C = {C6 /20 , C4/16 , C 3 / 7  , C 2 / 6  , Ci/3 , C 5 /2 ;
After step 2, we have
Tt = 0 , = 0  , j= 0 , for i= l,2 ,...,n.
After step 3 (j=0, loop one), we have 
T 1 = {C6 /2 0 } ,T 2  = {C4/16}
= 2 0 , \ ) 2  = 16
After step 4 (loop one), j=2
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After step 5 (loop one), we have 
/T2/16,7y20;
After step 3 (j=2, loop 2), we have 
T 2  = {C4 /I 6  , C 3 /7 ; ,
t)2=23,'U1=26
After step 4 (loop two), j=4
After step 5 (loop two), we have 
{Tj/26, T 2/23}
After step 3 (loop three, j=4), we have 
T ^ f C e / 2 0 , € 2 /6 , 0 ^ } ,
T 2  = {C4 / I 6  , c 3/7 , C 5 /2 ;
= 29, u 2  = 25
It can be seen that, for this example, algorithm 5.4 performs better than algo­
rithm 5.5. H.
The behaviors of the host and each processing elements follow:
Behavior o f Host
(1) Run algorithm 5.3 to assign affected constraints into n different groups, namely, 
T x , T 2 , . . . , T n.
(2) Assign group T{ to processing elements Px
(3) Wait for the message from the processing elements. If any constraint is violated, 
then reject the update; otherwise, commit the update.
Behavior o f Processing elements
(1) Validate the constraints assigned to it by the host.
(2) If any violation is detected, inform the host about the failure.
(3) If the validation of all the constraints in the group succeeds, then inform the host 
about the success.
5.6.3 Parallel Checking at Constraint Sub-formula Level
In this section, we discuss the parallel checking of constraints at the sub-formula 
level. Suppose a constraint Ct is decomposed into C/^C^, • • • ,C/m and there are n pro­
cessing elements. • • • ,5m are the cost coefficients and o l 5o2, • • • ,om are the 
sufficiency frequencies.
The behaviors of the host and the processing elements are as follows:
Behavior o f Host
(51
(1) Order Ct. (i=l, 2 ,... ,m) in descending order on the basis of —  to form a queue
° i
Q c -
(2) Assign one constraint sub-formula from the front of Qc to each available pro­
cessing element to validate.
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(3) Wait for the messages from the processing elements. If any constraint sub­
formula is satisfied, then inform all the processing elements involved to stop 
checking the current constraint sub-formulas. Then the host starts to check other 
constraint formulas.
Behavior o f  the processing elements
(1) Validate the constraint assigned to it by host.
(2) If the validation is a success, then inform the host about this.
(3) If the validation is a failure and there is still one subformula in the queue Qc, 
pick up one from the front of the queue and validate.
5.6.4 Performance
In chapter 4, we analyzed the performance of constraint enforcement in a unipro­
cessor based system with the application of decomposition theory. We made some 
assumptions about the distribution of run-time parameters, as performance depends on 
the distribution of the run-time parameters. Also, in a uniprocessor based system, the 
order in which a constraint sub-formula is checked is important in improving the per­
formance.
In this section, we try to analyze, performance when n processing elements are 
used. Suppose that the number of constraint sub-formulas is m and the cost to check 




Suppose there are n processing elements available and m constraint sub-formula 
decomposed from an original constraint C with a checking cost Tc , then the following 
results hold.
(1) In the worst case, the cost to validate constraint C with decomposition is Tc .
Tc
(2) If m<n, then the average cost to validate constraint C with decomposition is — .
m
Tc(3) If n<m, then the average cost to validate constraint C with decomposition is — .
n
Proof:
[1] The worst case occurs when the checking of all constraint sub-formulas fails. 
When this happens, there is no gain in utilizing multi-processors and the decom­
position technique, because the original constraint formula must be validated.
[2] If men, i.e., the number of constraint sub-formulas is less than the number of
processing elements, then each processing element can validate one constraint
sub-formula. Thus, on average, the cost for a multiprocessor based systems is 
TA C
m
[3] If n<m, i.e., the number of constraint sub-formulas is greater than the number of 
processing elements, then each processing element can validate more than one 
constraint sub-formulas. Thus, on average the cost in the multiprocessor based
. Tc 
systems is —  ■  
rt
The results of this theorem are very conservative, because by the way that con­
straint sub-formulas is assigned to processing elements, it is very likely that a
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constraint sub-formula will be satisfied in an early stage.
5.7 Summary
In this chapter, we have discussed the enforcement of constraints on a multipro­
cessor based system. We investigated the parallelism that exists in a database manage­
ment system. We proposed a database machine architecture which support both SIMD 
and MIMD mode operations. With the constraint decomposition theory developed in 
chapter 3, we can enforce constraints in parallel.
Chapter VI: Local Enforcement Tuning
6.1 Introduction
In the previous chapters, we have developed a constraint decomposition theory 
and applied the theory to constraint enforcement in both sequential and parallel com­
putational environments. It is noted that the enforcement methods discussed in chapter 
4 and 5 are at a very high level. In sequential environments, they deal with the issue of 
how to utilize the run-time characteristics of a database state to determine the check­
ing order to achieve global efficiency. In parallel environments, they deal with 
finding a way to distribute constraints or constraint sub-formulas to processing ele­
ments so that the processing power of a multi-processor based system can be maxi­
mally exploited. In neither case have we tried to answer the question of how to check 
each individual constraint sub-formula or formula. In this chapter, existing techniques 
are extended and used to further simplify each constraint sub-formula at the time of 
validation. By doing so, we will complete the proposed integrated approach to data­
base constraint enforcement.
6.2 Characteristics of Enforcement Tuning
At the stage of constraint decomposition, only the properties of the constraint 
formula is used. When we consider the question on how we actually validate each 
individual constraint sub-formula, more information is available in tuning the con­
straint enforcement.
The information available at this stage, which is not known previously is:
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[1 ] Types of the formula: We have a set of constraint sub-formulas, each consisting 
of the conjunction of atomic formulas. In general, constraint sub-formulas 
involved contain less quantifiers than the original formula.
[2] types of Update. At this stage, we know whether the update is insert, delete or 
modify.
[3] The tuples(data) to be updated, which can be used to simplify the constraint sub- 
formula before validating.
Consequently, each individual constraint sub-formula is much simpler than the 
original one. Furthermore, more information can be used to enforce the simpler con­
straint sub-formulas. Our goal is to find methods to enforce efficiently each constraint 
sub-formula, utilizing the additional information available at this stage. It is also 
observed that local enforcement tuning is done at run-time, i.e., at the time when a 
database update is to be carried out.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.3 introduces the prelim­
inary concepts that we need for the later discussions. Section 6.4 presents methods in 
evaluating simple constraint sub-formulas which involve at most two quantifiers. Sec­
tion 6.5 discusses an approach in validating a certain class of constraint subformulas 
which involves multiple ranges. Section 6 . 6  concludes this chapter.
6.3 Preliminaries
This section introduces the basic terms and facts for the sake of clear presenta­
tion of the following sections.
DEFINITION 6.1 (Target Variables)
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Let ( Q x e  R ) M b e a n  integrity constraint, where Q is either V or 3, R is a rela­
tion name, and M is a valid constraint formula. If an update is on relation R, then x is 
called a target variable. ■
It is clear that target variables largely determine the truthfulness of an integrity 
constraint upon a database update.
DEFINITION 6.2 (Substitution)
A substitution \|/ is a set of pairs { X\!tx, x 2 /t2, ... , xm/tm}; where the x / s  are 
distinct tuple variables and the ti 's are tuple constants. Applying \|/ to a vcf W leads to 
the vcf W(\j/)( called an instance of W) where each tuple variable which appears both 




If (D3 , / 3) is to be inserted into the relation SALE, then x is called the target variable.
Applying the substitution { x / (Z)3 , / 3)} to the constraint, we have:
3ye SUPPLY((y.DEPT=D 3)A(y.ITEM=/3)) ■
Let W be a valid constraint sub-formula. If we replace every occurrence of 
x 1 , x 2 , • • • ,x m in W by t 1 , t 2 , • • • ,tm respectively, then we denote the resulting 
instance by W(x l/ t l , x 2 /t2 , • • • jcm/tm).
Since a constraint formula is a closed formula, every tuple variable is bound to a 
given relation. Thus, there is one range prefix for any variable appearing in a
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constraint formula. When a tuple constant is substituted for a tuple variable, the 
corresponding range prefix will be removed from the resulting formula(instance).
The following lemmas are needed in the development of the simplification pro­
cess for constraint sub-formula validation.
LEMMA 6.1:
The following equations hold:
(V*e/?)W  sV x(jce/?->W ) (6.1)
(3xe/?)W  = 3x(xg /?aW ) (6.2)
Vx(xe{%}—»W) =  Wixlx)  (6.3)
Proof:
The proofs of the above equations follow directly from the definitions of V, 3, 
and substitution.!
LEMMA 6.2:
Let Rfuw be the relation obtained by adding a tuple % to a relation R0 id , that is, 
Rnew =R 0 idKJ{x}> then the following holds.
( V x e R ^ W  = (VxeRold)WAW(x/T) (6.4)
= (^ x e R 0id)WvW(x/x)  (6.5)
Proof:
Formulas (6.4) and (6.5) are intuitively correct. The formal proofs are as follows.
The proof of (6.4)
( V x e R ^ W  = \ /x (x e R new-*W) By (6.1).
= Vxi-oceRfun vW )
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i Vx (—i(x e  Rold vx e {x})vW)
: Vx ((-ix e  Rold a —ix e {x})vW )
: Vx((-oc(=RoldvW)A(-nxe{x}vW))
Vx ((x e  - 4 ^ ) A ( x 6 f T j ^ ) )
Vx ((x e  ) a  W (x  Ix)) (6.3).
Vx (x e Rold -^ W ) a  W  (x /x)
(V xeR old)WA\V(x/x)
The proof o f  (6.5)
(B x e /? ^ )!^  sB xC xe/e^A W ) (6.2).
E=3x((xe /?oW v x g {x})a W)
= 3x((xe  Rold a  W )v(x e  (x}a W))
= 3x((xe/?oWAW)vW(x/x)) By (6.3)
= 3x (x € Rold a W )v W (x Ix)
= (3x<=Rold)AWvW(xlx)
LEMMA 6.3:
Let R^w  be the relation obtained by deleting a tuple x from a relation Rold, that 
is, R , ^  = R0 id -  (x), then the following holds.
(V xe R old)W = (Vx e R ^  )W aW (x Ix) (6.6)
(3x € Rold )W = (3x e R ^  )W vW  (x Ix) (6.7)
Proof:
The proof o f (6 .6 )
(Vx € Rold )W s  Vx (x e  /?oW )
s  \ f x ( - x e R o[dvW )
== Vx ( i(x e R ^  vx e  {x})vW )
By (6.1).
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s  Vx ((-x  e  a -oc <= {x j)vW )
= V x ((-* e /? ^ v W )A (-a :e  fxjvW)) 
s  Vx ((x e R ^  ->W )a(x e  {%} ->W))
= Vx((xe/?nm -^iy)AW(x/x)) By (6.3).
s  Vx (x e R ^  —>W) a W (x Ix)
= (Vx € ^ ) W aW(x /X)
The proof o f  (6.7)
(3xeR old)W = 3 x(x eR oldAW)
s B x d x e R ^ v x e f x f i A W )
= 3x((x<= R ^  a  W )v (x s {x}a W)) 
b  3x ((x e  7 ? ^  aW )v W (x /x)) 
b  3x (x e 7 ? ^  a  W )vW  (x Ix)
^ Q x e R ^ A W v W C x / x )
U
With the preliminary concepts and facts presented, we can now proceed to intro­
duce our constraint enforcement tuning methods.
6.4 Evaluation of Simple Constraint Sub-formula
This section discusses the methods in evaluating simple constraint sub-formulas 
which involve at most 2 quantifiers. The methods of evaluation for insertion, deletion 
and modification will be studied in each sub-section.
6.4.1 Insertion Validation
In this sub-section, we first introduce a theorem which provides a theoretical 
foundation for simplifying the constraint sub-formula validation when a insertion 






L etRnew=Roldu{x) when a tuple x is inserted in relation R.
THEOREM 6.1: Suppose all constraint formulas are satisfied before a database 
update and x is to be inserted into relation R. If and jc2 are the only target variables, 
then the following holds:
(1) If the constraint sub-formula Cs is of the form: (V x x e  R)W , then Cs will be 
satisfied if and only if W(x j/x) is true.
(2) If the constraint sub-formula Cs is of the form:(3x1eR )W  , then Cs will always 
be satisfied.
(3) If the constraint sub-formula Cs is of the form: (Vxxe R )(Vx2e R )W , then Cs 
will be satisfied if and only if
(V x1e /?oW)lV(x2/i)A (V x2ei?oW)iy (x 1/x)AW(x1/x^:2/x) is true.
(4) If the constraint sub-formula Cs is of the form: (3x1eR )(3x2eR)W , then Cs 
will always be satisfied.
(5) If the constraint sub-formula Cs is of the form: (VxjeR )(3x2gR )W, then Cs 
will be satisfied if and only if (3x2eR  )W(x i/x) v W (x 1/xpc:2/x) is true.
(6) If the constraint sub-formula Cs is of the form: (3x1eR )(V x2eR)W , then Cs 
will be true if and only if
(3XjeR )((Vx2e R )W a W (x2/x))v(Vx2e R )W (x x!x)a W (x 1/t^c2/x) 
is true.
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Proof o f  (1):
According to lemma 6.2, (Vx xe )Wee(Vx x<=R0 id ) W a  W (x ̂ x). Because
(Vx Rold )W is true in the current database, W is true if and only if
W(xj/x) is true.
Proof of (2):
According to lemma 6.2, (3x e  )W=(3x e Rold) v W (x /x). Because
(BxeRold)W is true, (Bxei? ^ ) W  is true, too.
Proof o f (3):
By applying lemma 6.2 repeatedly, the following equation is derived.
( ^ i e ^ ) ( V x 2e/?mv)W=(Vx1e /? ^ v)((Vx2e/?oW)W A ^(x2/x))
=(Vx ie )(Vx2e Rold )W a  (Vx j€ )W (x2/x)
=(Vx je /?oW )(Vx2e Rold )W a (Vx 2e )VK (x j/x)
a(Vx 2 e/?oW)W (x2/x)Aiy (x j/x,x2/x)
Because (Vx j e  Rold)Vx 2e # oW )W is true, as a result, (Vx1e/?rtevv)(Vx2e/?ngvv)W 
is true if and only if (\/x 2 e R old)W (x t/x)A(Vx l e/?oW )W (x2 Ix)aW (x is true.
Proof o f  (4):
By applying lemma 6.2 repeatedly, the following equation is derived.
(3* 1 eRn*, )(3x2e R ^ W ^ & x ^ R ^  )((3x2e v W (x2/x))
=(3x je Rfuw )(3x2e /?oW )W v(3x1e7?n<?vv )W (x2/x)) 
=(3x je )(3x 2e ) W v(3x 2e 7 ?^ ) W (x fx )
v(3X ieR oid)W (x2/x)vH/ ̂ / x ^ / t )
Because (3x ̂ / ? oW )(3x2e /?oW )W is true, so is (3x xe Rnew )(3x2e )W.
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The proof o f  (5):
By applying lemma 6.2 repeatedly, the following equation is derived.
(V *  leRnew ) ( 3 * 2 eRnew W 1̂ Rnew ) ( ( 3 * 2 eRold W  v W ( * 2/X))
«CVx ̂ R old )((3x2e Rold )W vW  (x2 /x)) 
a ( ( 3 x 2s  Rold )W (.x X!x)\/W (x f x  jc2 /x))
Since (y x ie R 0 [d)((3x2 e R 0 id)W vW (x 2 /x)) is always true, so
(V xieR new)(3x2 BRnew)W is true if and only if (3x2 e R oid)W ix Xlx)\/W {xxlxjc2 /x) is 
true.
The proof o f  (6 ):
By applying lemma 6.2 repeatedly, the following equation is derived.
(3* le R new XV* 2e R new W  = @ X  j€ R ^  ) ( (  V* 2e RoU )W AW (x  2/X))
=(3* iG Rold )((V*2e Rold )W *W (x  2/x)) 
v((Vx2e Rold )W ( x  j / t ) a  W ix xlx* 2 lx))
Thus (3xieRnew)i\fx 2 e R new)W is true if and only if 
(3* x(=Rold )HVx2 e R old )a !V (*2/x))v((Vx2e/?oW )1V(x j/xlAiy ix xIXyX2 lx)) is true. ■
The above theorem provides a theoretical foundation to validate a constraint 
sub-formula which is either one of the six forms mentioned above. In the next subsec­
tion, we present an algorithm based on the theorem.
6.4.1.2 Insertion Validation Algorithm
Figure 6.1 is an insertion validation algorithm based on the theorem developed in 
the previous subsection.
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Algorithm 6.1: (Insertion Validation)
Input: A constraint sub-formula Cs and 
a tuple x to be inserted.
Output: A Status indicating whether Cs is satisfied or not.
Step-1: If Cs- ( y x le R  )W, then 
C;=W(Xl/x)
else if Cs=(3x jeR  )W, then 
C'=T
else if Cs =(Vx R )(Vx 2e R )W , then 
C>(V x Rold )W (x 2/x )a (V x 2£  Rold )W (x x/x) 
A W  (X l/XyX^'Z)
else if Cs =(3xjei? )(3x2 e R )W, then
c > r
else if Cs=(Vxje/? )(3x2e/? )W, then 
Cs=(3x2e R )W (x x/z) v  W (x xlxjc2 lx)
else if Cs =(3x 2 e /?) (Vx 2e /?)W, then 
C5'=(3xiefl )((Vx2e/? )W a W(x 2/x))
v(Vx2e i? )W (x j/x)aW (x i/xjc2 Ix)
Step-2: Replace in Cs each pre-valued literal
by its truth value and apply, as much as possible 
the following absoiption rules. 
i T s F ;  - iF  = T;
T v A e T ;  F v A = A 
T a A e A ;  F a A e F
Step-3: Validate the resulting formula derived in step 2 in 
the current database state.
Figure 6.1. A Simple Insertion Validation Algorithm
109
Example 6.2:
Let R( U , V , W ) be a relation scheme and Cs =(Vx e  /? )(*.V < 10). If 
x=(3 5 22) is inserted in R, then after step 1, Cs=(2<10). After step 2, C'=T. Then, 
step 3 will return a status indicating that Cs is satisfied. ■
6.4.2 Deletion Validation
In this sub-section, we first introduce a theorem which provides a theoretical 
foundation for simplifying a constraint sub-formula validation when a deletion update 
is to be carried out. Then an algorithm based on the theorem will be presented.
6.4.2.1 Deletion Theorem
Let x be the only one target variable in the given constraint sub-formula Cs and 
let Rnew =R0id ~ (x)  when a tuple x is deleted from relation R.
THEOREM 6.2: Suppose all constraint formulas or sub-formulas are satisfied before 
a database update and x is to be deleted from relation R. If x  i and x 2  are the only tar­
get variables, then the following holds:
(1) If the constraint sub-formula Cs is of the form (V x x e R)W , then Cs will be 
always satisfied.
(2) If the constraint sub-formula Cs is of the form:(3x1eR )W  , then Cs will be 
satisfied if W (x j/x) is false.
(3) If the constraint sub-formula Cs is of the form: (Vx1e/?)(VX2e/?)lV , then Cs 
will be always satisfied.
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(4) If the constraint sub-formula Cs is of the form: (3x 1<=R)(3x 2ie R )W: Cs will be 
satisfied if )W(x2 lx)/\(3x2 <aRnew)W(xilx)/\W (xilx,x2 lx) is false.
(5) If the constraint sub-formula Cs is of the form: (Vjc1ei?)(3x2e/?)W , then Cs 
will be satisfied if (BxieRneyv)W(x 2 !x) is false.
(6) If the constraint sub-formula Cs is of the form: (3x1e/?)(Vx2e/?)W , then Cs 
will be true if (\/x 2 e R new )W (x 1/ x ) a W (x  xIxjc2 Ix) is false.
Proof o f  (1):
According to lemma 6.3, ( i x l&Rold )W =(Vx i ^ R ^  )W a W(x  fx). Because
W is true in the current database, (Vxl&Rnew)W is true after a deletion
update.
Proof o f  (2):
According to lemma 6.3, (3x ieR old )W =(3x\^ R new )v W (x fx). Because
(3xiGR0 id)W is true, if W (xfx )  is false, then (^x l&Rnew)W must be true.
Proof o f  (3):
By applying lemma 6.3 repeatedly, the following equation is derived.
(Vx xe R old )(Vx2e Rotd )W =(Vx je Rold )((Vx 2e Rnew )W a  W 0 2/t))
=(Vx ie Rold )(Vx2e Rmw )W a(V x l g  Rold )W (x 2 /x) 
=(Vx iS Rnew )(Vx2e Rnew )W a(V x 2e  Rnew )W (x j/x) 
a(V x  \^R new )W (x 2 /x)aW (x  fXyX^x)
Because (Vx ̂ R ^ C V x ^ R ^ W  is true, (V x le R new)(Vx2 e R new)W is true.
Proof o f (4):
I l l
By applying lemma 6.3 repeatedly, the following equation can be derived.
(3* Is  Roid )<3*2® Roid W = @ x  ie  Rold )((3x2e Rnew )W vW  (x2/x))
=(3x je Rold )(3x2g 7?^, )v(3x ̂ R old )W (x2/x)) 
=(3x 16/ ? ^  )(3x2e7?wew )W v ^ e T ^  )W (x fx) 
v(3x i^Rnew  )W (x2/x)vW (x ]/X,X2/X)
Because (3a: xe 7?oW)(3x 2g 7?0 w) W is true, to guarantee the truthfulness of
(3* ^  )(3x2e 7?nevv )W, (3x2e  7?^  )W (x 1/x)v(3x 2e 7?^  )W (x2/x ) v f  (x 2/x,x2/x)
must be false.
The proof o f  (5):
By applying lemma 6.3 repeatedly, the following equation is derived.
(Vx je 7l old )(3x 2e 7?oW )JV =(Vx 2e 7?oW )((3x2g R ^  )W v W  (x 2/x))
=(Vx je 7 ?^  )((3x 2e R ^  )W  v W  (x2/x)) 
a((3x2g R jum )JV (x x/x) vW (x i/x,x2/x))
Because (Vx1g7?oW)(Vx2g7?oW)W is true, ( V x 1e R newX (3 x 2GRnew) W v W ( x 2/x))
must be true. Thus, if ( \/x leR new)W (x2/x) is false, then (Vx Rnew )(3x2g Rnew )W
will be true.
The proof o f (6 ):
By applying lemma 6.3 repeatedly, the following equation is derived.
(3x ie 7loUi )(Vx2e Rold )W =(3x xz R old )((Vx2e R ^  )W a W  (x2/x))
-(3x Rnew )((Vx 2e Rnew )W a W (x 2/x)) 
v((Vx2e7?n£w )W (x fx)AW  (x fxjc^x))
Because (3x x e Rold)(Vx 2g Rold)W  is true, (3x ̂  7 ?^  )(Vx2e R ^  )W is true if
(Vx2g7?wm>)W (x f x ) A W (xj/x,x2/x) is false. ■
Theorem 6.2 provides a theoretical foundation for validating a constraint sub­
formula when a deletion update is to be carried out. However, some conditions for 
ensuring the correctness of the original formula is not necessary, i.e., the failure of 
those condition may not guarantee the failure of the original constraint. For example, 
consider the second case: if x is deleted from relation R, and W (xj/t) is false, then the 
update does not violate the constraint sub-formula. However, even if Wipc^lx) is true, 
it is still possible that ( B x ^ R ^  )W is true. Nevertheless, if the number of tuples in R 
that satisfy W is small, then the possibility of violation by deleting a tuple is also 
small. Otherwise, if the number of tuples in R that satisfy W is very large, then the 
possibility of violation by deleting a tuple is still small because there are many other 
tuples that satisfy W. It will pay off to record the number of tuples which satisfy W, 
denoted by NR. If a tuple x is to be deleted from R, and W (x j/x) is false, then the 
update does not violate this constraint sub-formula. On the other hand, if W (x j/x) is 
tme, then one is subtracted from NR. If NR is zero, then the constraint sub-formula is 
violated, otherwise, the constraint sub-formula is still satisfied.
6.4.2.2 Deletion Validation Algorithm
In this sub-section, we present an deletion simplification algorithm based on the 
theorem described above. The input to this algorithm includes a constraint sub­
formula Cs and a tuple x that is to be deleted. The output is a status variable indicating 
whether Cs is satisfied or not.
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Algorithm 6.2: (deletion validation)
Input: A constraint sub-formula Cs and
a tuple x to be deleted
Output: A Status indicating whether Cs is satisfied 
or not.
Step-1: If Cs =(Vx ̂  R ) W , then
C'S=T.
else if Cs =(3x )W, then
Cs=-iW (.x i/x).
else if Cs = ( V x R )(VX2eZ?)lV, then 
C'=T.
else if CjKBxie/? )(3x2eZ? )W, then 
Cs'-n (  3 x xe Rnew )W(x2/x)A(3x2e Rnew)W{x i/x)
a  W (xj/xp:2/x)
else if C5 =(Vx jeZ? )(3x2eZ? )W, then 
Cs=-!(3x je )W (x 2/x)
else if Cs =(3x^7? )(Vx2eZ? )W, then 
Cs=-n(Vx2e )1V (x )/x) a ^  (x  i/iyt 2/x)
Step-2: Replace in Cs each pre-valued literal
by its truth value and apply, as much as possible 
the following absorption rules:
- i T  =  F; - i F s T ;
T v A e A; F v A e A;
T a  A = A; F  a  A =  F;
Step-3: Validate the formula derived in step 2 in the current
database state.
Figure 6.2. A Deletion Validation Algorithm
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6.4.3 Modification Validation
Modification is considered to be a special transaction that consists of an deletion 
followed by a insertion. Thus, modification can be validated using the theorems 
developed in the previous two sub-sections. Suppose a tuple x in R is to be modified to 
x. The following illustrates the methods utilizing theorems 6.1 and 6.2 to validate 
modification updates.
Example 6.3: Let the constraint sub-formula Cs to be of the form: ( \ /x i^ R )W . 
Because of theorem 6.2(1), deleting x from R does not violate Cs . Furthermore, 
because of theorem 6.1 (1), inserting x into R satisfies Cs if and only if W (xxl%) is 
true. ■
Example 6.4: Let the constraint sub-formula Cs to be of the form: (Bxje/? )IV. Con­
sidering theorems 6.1 and 6.2 together, the modification is true if one of the following 
is true:
(1) W(x  j/x) is false.
(2) W (x j/x ) is true.
(3) (Bx e R )W  is true. ■
6.4.4 Discussion
It is observed that the goal of constraint enforcement tuning is to further simplify 
constraint sub-formulas so that it takes less time to validate the resulting constraint 
sub-formulas. It may appear that a derived constraint sub-formula is more complex
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than the original one. However, the complexity is not measured by the length of the 
constraint sub-formulas, but by their checking spaces or the effort in reversing a data­
base update.
It is also observed that the simple validation procedures can deal only with cer­
tain forms of constraint sub-formulas. Some forms of constraint formulas do not have 
both the necessary and sufficient conditions. For those cases, some other methods 
needs to be investigated, or the database update needs to be validated against the ori­
ginal constraint. Nevertheless, the materials presented so far serve the purpose to com­
plete the proposed methodology.
6.5 Evaluation of Multiple Range Constraints
In the previous sections, the methods for evaluating a single update on a single 
range constraint sub-formula were presented. This section will touch upon the issues 
on evaluating multiple(two) updates against multiple(two) range constraints.
Definition 6.3: CMultiple Range Constraint)
A constraint formula/sub-formula is called a multiple range constraint if it is of 
the form Q j • • • Qnxne R nM  and not all the /?, are same. Qt is either V or 3. If 
all the Rt are same, then the constraint formula or sub-formula is called a single range 
constraint. ■
Definition 6.4: (Multiple Update)
If more than one tuple is updated before checking an integrity constraint, then 
the group of updates is called a multiple update. ■
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With the above definitions, we now investigate the simplification process for 
checking a 2-range constraint with a 2-update.
6.5.1 Insertion Validation
Theorem 6.3: Suppose all constraint formulas are satisfied before x1 is inserted into 
R 1 and x2 is inserted into R 2. I f* !  and x 2 are the only target variables, then the fol­
lowing holds:
(1) If the constraint sub-formula Cs is of the form: (Vjr16 /?1)(Vx2e /? 2)W, then Cs 
will be satisfied if and only if
(Vxi^R o idW (x 2/ x2) a (V x 2 s R m W ( x i /x V w (x 1/x1^c2̂ 2) is true.
(2) If the constraint sub-formula Cs is of the form: (3x1e l? 1)(3x2e l?2)W, then Cs 
will always be satisfied.
(3) If the constraint sub-formula Cs is of the form: (Vx1e /? 1)(3x2e /?2)W, then Cs 
will be satisfied if and only (3x2 e R 2!d)W (xi/xl) v lV C rj/x '^ /x 2) is true.
(4) If the constraint sub-formula Cs is of the form: (3x1e /? 1)(Vx2e /?2)W, then Cs 
will be true if and only if
( 3 x 1e / ? 01w ) ( ( V x 2 e ^ ) W A W ( x 2 / x 2 ) ) v ( V x 2 e / ? 2 ) W ( x 1/ x 1) A W ( x 1/ x 1 ^ 2 / x 2 )
is true.
Proof of (1):
(Vx l€ R ^ w )(Vx 2e R 2w )W=(Vx R ^  )((Vx 2e R 2d )W aW (x  2/ x2))
=(Vx l€ )(Vx2e R 2ld )W a ( V x  ^ R ^ w)W (x 2/ x2)
=(Vx jG R0)d)(Vx2e R 2ld)W a  (V x 2 e R 2ld)W (xj/x1)
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a ( V x  jG Rom )W (x 2!x2)a W (x j/x1 a  2/x2)
Since (Vj:1e/?01w) is true, as a result, (Vx 2 e 7?^,)(Vx 2e )W is true if and
only if (Vx 2 e R 2ld)W ( x j / t ^ V x ie R 0)d)W (x 2/x2)a W(x ^ x ^ / t 2) is true.
Proof o f (2):
<3* ie  ̂  )(3* 2e  ̂ ) W=(3x je Z?„^ )((3x 2g R 2ld W  vW (x2/x2))
=(3x jG Z?^, ) ( 3 x 2g  Z?Jrf)v(3x jG Z ?^  )JV (x2/x2)) 
=(3x j G Z?0i/ )<3* 2g  Z?02rf)  W v(3x2eZ?j^)iy (x j/x1) 
v Cx j g Z ? ^ ) ! ^  (x 2/ t 2) v W  ( x ^ i 1^ / ! 2)
Because is true, so is (3x jgZ ?^)(3x2g Z ? ^ )W.
The proof o f (3):
(V x 1e R jew)(3x2 e R £ w)W =(Vx1e R flew)((3x2 e R 02tdW ''W (x 2 /T2))
=(VX lGR0)dX(3x2 eR 02te)W vW  (x2/x2)) 
a ( ( 3 x 2g  R2mW  (x j / x V f  (x fx'jc^x2))
Since
(Vx lg Z?0)d )((3x 2g Z?Jd) W v W (x 2/t2)) 
is always true, so (VxjgZ ^ X B x^ Z ? ,^ ) ^  is true if and only if
(3x 2g  R 2ld )W (x xlxl)vW ( x f x 1̂  ̂ x2)
is true.
The proof o f (4):
(3xle R ^ ) ( V x 2e R ^ ) W H ^ i e R , L ) ( ( V x 2e R 2ld)WAW(x2/x2))
=(3x ieZ ?i)((V x2G R 2ld)/\W (x2/x2)) 
v ( ( V x 2gZ? 2ld)W ( x  x/x1)a W ( x  f x ' j c ^ x 2))
Thus (HxjgZJ^XV x^ Z ? ^ ) ^  is true if and only if
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(3* Is R oid)((v *2e Rold) (x2/x2))v(( Vx2e Roid W (x xIx1)aW (x 1/ x l ^c2/x2)) is true.
■
6.5.2 Deletion Validation
THEOREM 6.4: Suppose all constraint formulas or sub-formulas are satisfied before
x1 is deleted from relation R 1 and x2 is deleted from R 2. If x j and x 2 are the only tar­
get variables, then the following holds:
(1) If the constraint sub-formula Cs is of the form: ( \/x 1GR 1)(Vx 2 e R 2 )W, then Cs 
will be always satisfied.
(2) If the constraint sub-formula Cs is of the form: (3xxeR  l)(3x2 e R 2 )W: Cs will be 
satisfied if (3x i e R ^ ,  )1V (x 2 /x2 )a(3x 2g R 2̂  ) IV (x  xIx1)aW  (x xlxljc2 l%2) is false.
(3) If the constraint sub-formula Cs is of the form: (Vx1e /? 1)(3x2ei?2)W, then Cs 
will be satisfied if (3xie R f̂ w)W (x2/x2) is false.
(4) If the constraint sub-formula Cs is of the form: (3x 1e R 1)(\/x 2 g R 2 )W, then Cs 
will be true if \ /x 2 eR^cw)W (xxIxx)aW (x Xl x x, x 2lx2) is false.
Proof o f (1):
( V x i e R ^ x z e R ^ W ^ x ^ R ^ X ^ E R ^ W A W i x ^
= (y x xe R xld) ^ x 2E R 2w)W A (\ /xxe R xld)W(x2/ ^ )  
=(Vx je  7?^, )(Vx2e R 2̂  ) W a ( \ / x 2g  R ^  )W ( x  j / x 1) 
a ( V x  ^ R ^ W i x ^ A W i x  i / x W x 2) 
and (Vx ̂ R xld)(\/x2<= R 2!d)W is true, so (Vx1e /? ^ M,)(Vx26i?/2M,)lV is also true.
119
Proof o f (2):
Because of the following equation
(3xi<=R0)d)(3x2e Rm W =(Bx 1e R 0\d)((3x2e  R ^ ) W  vW  (x2/x2))
=(3x1<=R0 1ld)(3x2e  )v(3x js  R0)d)W  (x2/x2))
=(3* )(3*2e RIL, )W  v(3x2e R 2̂  )W  (x j/X1)
v(x je  R ^  )W (x 2 /z2 )vW  (x  f t 1 x  2/ t 2) 
and (3 x 1e R 01!d)(3x2 eR 02id)W is true, to guarantee the truthfulness of
3* l ^ R r L )(3*2e RL W . (3*2e R, L W (*f x lM x , e R ^ ) W (x2/x2)vW(x  1/x1̂ 2/x2) 
must be false.
The proof o f (3):
Because of the following equation:
(Vxlz R 0)d)(3x2e R 02ld)W=(Vx1e R 0lld)((3x2e R 2w)W vW (x2/x2))
=(Vx l€ R ^ w ) ( 0 * 2e  R ^ W v W  (x2/t2)) 
a ( ( 3 x 2s  R ) W  ( x  j/x^vlV (x  1/x1̂ c2/x2)) 
and { y x ^ R i ld){\fx2 <ER2ld)W is true. So (VxleR^ew){{3x2 e R ^ ) W vW (x2/x2)) must
be true. Thus, if (ffxle.Rflew)W(x2lT2) is false, then (Vx2e 7 ?^ ,)(3x2e R 2ew)W must
be true.
The proof o f (4):
Because of the following equation:
(3x je  Z?^ )(Vx2e R 2ia)W=(3x\eR^d )((Vx 2e R^w)W a W  (x 2/x2))
=(3xie/?„1evv)((Vx2e /? ^ )A l^ (x 2/x2)) 
v((Vx2e 7?^, )W(x1/x1)aIV (x j / t ^ / c2))  
and (3x1eZ?<Ja)(Vx2eZ?<J /)W’ is true. So (Bxi s R ^ )(Vx2e ) 1 T  is true if
(\/x 2 e R ^ w)W (x 1/x1)aW(x 1/x1̂ c2/x2) is false. ■
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6.5.3 Discussion
In this section, we have introduced enforcement methods for multiple (two) 
range and multiple(two) update problem. This serves mainly for theoretical interest, as 
it is a generalization of single range single update problem. Yet, more work is needed 
to further generalize those methods to handle arbitrary transactions.
6.6 Summary
In this chapter, we have discussed methods for enforcing each constraint sub­
formulas. We presented theorems and algorithms for validating a single update against 
single range constraint sub-formulas which include at most two quantifiers. We also 
touched upon the issues on enforcing multiple updates against multiple range con­
straints.
Constraint enforcement tuning is done at run-time. There are other simplification 
methods that can also be used in this framework.
Chapter VII: Conclusions
7.1 Introduction
In the preceding chapters, an integrated constraint enforcement methodology 
with the application of constraint decomposition theory was addressed. The develop­
ment of a constraint decomposition theory which provides a foundation for efficient 
constraint enforcement in both uniprocessor and multiprocessor based systems was a 
major goal of this research. In this chapter the significance of this work is summarized 
and several avenues of future research are identified.
7.2 Significance
This research work is a result of a long term study on constraint management in 
database and expert database systems. It is a natural result of the deficiency of previ­
ous methods and the perception of the author about new facets of the problem which 
can leads to a more efficient solution.
As modem database systems manage very large volume of data and the number 
of constraints are huge, the time spent in checking constraints is quite expensive. 
Many researchers have been working to alleviate the problems by:
(1) Limiting the range of the integrity constraints. Assume that the old database 
state is consistent prior to each update. When a database is updated, only the part 




(2) Making use of existing information.
(3) Making use of aggregate information.
(4) Logical simplification of constraint formulas.
(5) Making use of physical properties of a database(index, etc).
However, the above mentioned approached are limited because:
•  They can be applied to only a few types of constraints,
•  It is not efficient enough.
To overcome the deficiencies of previous approaches, we realized that the funda­
mental problem of their approaches was the failure to understand the nature of the 
constraint enforcement problem. The nature of constraint enforcement is the protec­
tion of database integrity from accidental violation. That is, the constraint is rarely 
violated, just as drivers are rarely involved in a car accident. The result of the 
misunderstanding of the problem is the isolation of logical properties of integrity con­
straint formulas and the physical characteristics of a database. Previous researchers 
either tried to simplify the constraint formula independent of the characteristics of a 
database state and update patterns, or they tried to design good access methods or a 
data structure independent of the logical properties of constraint formulas. Because 
the logical properties of integrity constraint formulas and the physical characteristics 
of database are related, we cannot achieve overall efficiency without considering them 
at the same time. With the assumption that the probability of a database constraint is 
extremely small, we can make use of the characteristics of the database state, update 
pattern and logical properties of database constraints to develop an efficient database
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enforcement methodology.
The major contributions of this research are:
[1] For the first time, the new perspective of database constraint enforcement prob­
lem is studied. The novelty of the proposed methodology starts from the under­
standing of the nature of the problem. The philosophy to approach a problem in 
this way is in itself a contribution.
[2] For the first time, the characteristics of database update and state is considered in 
connection with properties of constraint formulas in enforcing constraints. Previ­
ous approaches failed to consider the dynamic nature of the database. They either 
ignore the physical properties of databases or properties of constraint formulas.
[3] We introduce a formal decomposition procedure to decompose a constraint for­
mula into a set of constraint subformulas so that each constraint sub-formula can 
be enforced independently. Because of the locality of database updates, some 
constraint formulas are more efficient to check than others.
[4] Parallel checking of constraints has been discussed. Because of the indepen­
dence of constraint sub-formulas, our approach provide a possible way to enforce 
constraints in parallel. Also, integrity constraint enforcement in a multiprocessor 
based database machine was discussed.
[5] The staged approach makes it possible to attack the different, problems at dif­
ferent times. Constraint decomposition is done at compile time and is done only 
once, at the time a constraint is defined. Although both global enforcement stra­
tegy and local enforcement tuning are to be done at run-time, the isolation of the
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global enforcement strategy and local enforcement tuning is superior to previous 
integrated approaches, because the problems to be solved at the two stages are 
different. Thus, by isolation we can concentrate on solving different problems at 
different times.
7.3 Further Research
The completion of the research reported here has given insight into related areas 
which might be fruitfully investigated.
1. Searching For Other Decomposition Methods
The question whether there exists other constraint decomposition methods which 
are better than the one presented in this research needs to be answered. As the decom­
position theory developed has made use of only syntactic properties of constraint for­
mulas, we can see if semantic information be used to aid the decomposition process.
2. Checking Space
The analysis of constraint enforcement in terms of checking space was only 
briefly presented. How to precisely judge constraint enforcement based the criterion of 
checking space need further study.
3. Physical Implementation Issues
The work presented in this dissertation touched only upon the theoretical aspects 
of constraint enforcement problems. Physical implementation of constraint enforce­
ment has scarcely been discussed. The issues for physical representation of a con­
straint formula or sub-formulas in this framework needs further study.
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4. Deferred Checking
Sometimes, when the probability of constraint is small, more efficiency can be 
achieved by deferred checking. Deferred checking means that the validation of a con­
straint is not done right after a database update. Suppose the cost of checking some 
constraint is very big, then it may be beneficial to find a way to group a set of updates 
such that the group size is optimal in the sense to minimize the cost.
Formally, consider the following parameters:
k: Cost to validate a constraint.
(i: Cost to update a tuple
p: The probability that an update violates a constraint
f. The probability that an update satisfies a constraint. Note that y=l-p
Tu(n ): The total cost for n updates with undeferred checking.
Td(n ): The total cost for n updates with deferred checking.
Based on the above parameters, we have the following equations for Tu and Td
Tu =n K+n !i+p(|i+K )+p2(|j.+K)+ • • • +p" (p+K) 
l - o "=n (p+K )+p— t — (|i+K) 
i - p
=n (|i+ K )+ -^-(l-p"  )(|I+K) (7.1)
P
r d=K+n|H-(l-y, )(n|l+K) (7.2)








probability of violation (p)
Figure 7.1 Optimal Deferred Checking
Figure 7.1 shows graphically the philosophy of the above mentioned approach. 
As we can see from the figure 7.1, the higher the probability of constraint violation, 
the smaller the group size. For a given probability of constraint violation, there is a 
point in the curve with a corresponding group size. The corresponding group size on 
the curve is the optimal with respect to the given probability. In the area below the 
curve, we underutilize the opportunity of big group size, thus better efficiency, 
whereas in the area above the curve we overutilize the opportunity of big group size, 
i.e., we intend to achieve more efficiency that cannot be realized because of the fre­
quent transaction rollback.
5. Searching For Other Global Enforement Strategies
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The efficiency of a global enforcement strategy depends on many factors of a 
database system. Generally speaking, there is no single strategy that is superior to all 
others. When a configuration of a database system changes, a corresponding global 
enforcement strategy needs to be found to suit that configuration. The independence of 
the global enforcement strategy and local enforcement tuning makes this task a lot 
easier.
6 . Searching For Other Local Enforcement Tuning Methods
As pointed in the previous chapter, there are many other constraint simplification 
methods that can be extended or adapted for the purpose of local enforcement tuning. 
The success of an individual method also depends on some other factors such as, the 
supporting physical database structures, properties of a constraint sub-formulas and 
update patterns. Finding a good method for a given constraint sub-formula at a given 
time needs further investigation.
7.4 Concluding Remarks
The enforcement of integrity constraint in modem database or expert database 
systems is a difficult task. Database management software will be more successful if 
it has an efficient constraint enforcement mechanism. In this study we have attempted 
to develop a constraint decomposition theory which can be used in the constraint 
enforcement to improve the performance. A contribution to accomplish this has been 
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